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Pre fa ce
The purpose of this paper is to offer an interpretation of the Reich's 
involvement inSoutheastern Europe from 1933 to the capituation of Yugoslavia 
and Greece in 1941. It illustrates the method of German penetration as it occuired*- 
in distinct stages. Having primarily an economic motive at the outset, diplomatic 
and political developments between Germany and the Western democracies prompted 
the Reich to adopt an increasingly aggresive policy towards the Balkans.
By the very nature of its title , The Nazi Penetration into Southeastern 
Europe, 1933-41, this thesis evaluates Germany's change in policy, from economic 
penetration to political strangulation. The paper also supports the premise that the 
political saturation and military occupation of the Balkans were consequences of a 
successful German policy of economic exploitation. No preconceived plan for 
military subjugation of these states existed. However, as Germany's difficulties 
with the West increased, likewise did her ambitions concerning the Balkans. From 
1937 onward, the Reich began to realize the importance of the Southeast not only 
in terms of economics but also in respect to its strategic value.
Also of major importance to the thesis is the weakness shown by France 
and Great Britain in the face of N azi aggression. This paper emphasizes the con^ 
sequences of the West's hesitancy to halt the Nazis in their aggressive European 
policy. It facilitated the Reich's advancement into an isolated Southeastern 
Europe.
•  •  •
in
The majority of the sources contributing to the research for this paper are 
documentary. The most valuable reference materials are the League of Nations’ 
annual financial publications, World Economic Survey, Review of World Trade, 
and International Trade Statistics. Great Britain's Department of Overseas Trade 
publications also contributed heavily to the research. The most vital of the non­
economic references are the United States Department of State's Documents on 
German Foreign Policy, Series "C" and "D. "
O f the first-hand accounts, or memoirs, those of Ciano and Churchill are 
the most frequently cited. Others, such as Horthy, von Fapen, and Nicolson are 
used primarily for background study.
Many secondary sources are utilized, but the most valuable for this paper 
are Gerhard Schacher's Germany Pushes Southeast, Antonin Basch's The Danube 
Basin and the German Economic Sphere and John Luckacs1, The Great Powers and 
and Eastern. Europe. Special recognition must be given to the invaluable aid pro­
vided by the Royal Institute of International Affairs' Survey of International Affairs, 
1931-1941. These volumes provide an excellent guide for both reference and 
further bibliographical exploration.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENCIES AS OF
JANUARY 31, 1936*
2.5 REICHSMARK (Germany)
49. DINAR (Yugoslavia)
127 LEU (Rumania)
105 DRACHMA (Greece)
74 LEVA (Bulgaria)
3.5 PENGO (Hungary)
24 KORUNA (Czechoslovakia)
5 .4 SCHILLING (Austria)
16.0 FRANC (France)
.22 POUND (Great Britain)
*By no means are these figures stationary. Throughout the period 
covered by this paper, the values of the various currencies (with exception of the 
Reichsmark) fluctuated. The date, January 31, 1936, was chosen because it 
represented the most approximate consistency of the proportionate values during 
the era. Compiled from: :Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, V o l. 22, February, 1936 (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1936), pp. 3-45.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES.......................................................  vii
Chapter
•I. THE GERMAN AND BALKAN SITUATION IN 1933 . . -1
I I . REORIENTATION OF THE REICH'S COMMERCIAL
POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . .  ____  . . . . . . . .  17
I I I .  SCHACHT'S TOUR OF THE BALKANS . ...........................  38
IV . THE EFFECT OF THE ANNSCHLUSS AND THE
OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA O N  THE 
BALKAN STATES  ............... , . . . 51
V .  THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE BALKANS . . .  66
V I .  CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  100
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . ..........................   104
vi
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Total Value of World Trade, 1929-1932 ..................................   3
2. Decrease iirthe Reich's Overseas Supplies (1934-36) . . .  26
3. Trade Statistics Between Germany and the Balkans . . .  . 32
4. Yugoslavia Export-lmport Trade With Selected
European Countries .  .....................  41
vii
CHAPTER I
THE GERMAN AND BALKAN SITUATION IN  1933
Between 1929 and 1933 the whole world was in an economic crisis. Its
effects were felt not only in financial circles but in all aspects of life . The over-
expansion of world production during the first World War and the ensuing decade
had not been satisfactorily curbed, causing an over-abundance in agrarian produce.
A sharp reduction in the demand for agricultural products resulted in a drastic price
decrease, leaving millions jobless, poverty-stricken and starving.
Worldwide industrial production experienced a similar decline during the
years of the depression, In the years 1928-1932, total world production of manu-
2
factured goods decreased by 34 per cent.
One of the immediate effects of the economic debacle was an overwhelm­
ing number of people left jobless. It has been estimated that world unemployment
3in 1929 amounted to 10 million persons. By 1932, however, discounting
^Eugene N..Anderson, Modern Europe in World Perspective, 1914 to the
Present (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p . 332.
 ̂ Ib id., p. 329.
^ Ib id ., p. 332 .
1
2
4
part-time employed, the number approximated 40 m illion. The average rate of 
unemployment for the countries of Europe and North America reached nearly 25 
per cent.'*
Throughout the world, each country tried to ward off the effects of the
depression. Nations attempted to maintain an export surplus in order to keep as
6
many people employed as possible. On the other hand, each country restricted 
the quantity of its imports to a minimum of essentials.^ The entire system failed. 
Declining prices made it necessary to sell more and more abroad, Foreign sales 
became more difficult as each nation strove to become as self sufficient as their 
domestic resources would permit.
The Great Depression had many effects on the stability of the international 
economy. A world-wide tendency toward economic nationalism in the form of
g
tariffs was an early result. The universal imposition of tariffs ruined free trade 
throughout the world, as illustrated by the following table:
^ Ib id., p. 332. It is virtually impossible to arrive at an exact figure. 
The League of Nations publications set the figure at 25 million. See: League of 
Nations, World Economic Survey, 1932/33 (Geneva: 1932), p. 109. Hereafter 
cited as: League, W .E .5 .
c
Anderson, p , 332.
^This procedure became known as the "export of depression."
^ An derson, p . 335,
® League, W .E .5 ., 1931/1932, p. 65.
3
Table 1
9
Total Value of World Trade — 1929-1932 
(in millions)
Year Imports : Exports Total First Quarters
1929 35,606 33,035 68,641 15,292
1930 20,083 26,492 55,575 13,885
1931 20,847 18,922 39,769 9,685
1932 13,885 12,726 26,611 6,460
1933 6,006
An overall effect of the depression was a sixty-five per cent decline
10
in world trade from the first quarter of 1929 to the same quarter in 1933. The 
disruption of normal trade by the inauguration of restrictive tariffs had the overall 
effect of a shrinkage of world markets. Accordingly, trading countries, particu­
larly debtor nations, experienced increasing difficulty in gaining credit. This in 
turn produced a highly tightened money situation, a decline in national income 
and a rise in unemployment.
^ League, W .E .S . ,  1932/33, p. 2 , 
^  Ibid., p. 3.
^  League, W .E .S ., 1931/32, p. 66.
4
The decision of Great Britain and the United States to abandon the gold 
standard did not serve to lessen the problem of financial stability but in fact com­
plicated i t .  By mid-1933, three main currency groups in the world had emerged.
These monetary factions were the gold bloc, the sterling bloc and the dollar 
12bloc. France and Italy led the countries of the gold bloc, Great Britain and 
the United States formed the nucleus of the sterling and dollar blocs, respectively. 
By 1933, however, a fourth group composed entirely of debtor nations, with 
Germany as the most prominent member, began to form. This was known as the
13foreign exchange bloc, whose common goal was the maintenance of the indivi-
14dual currencies of the various states. Besides Germany, the new bloc consisted
15
of Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia ,
In January, 1933, Germany underwent the most abrupt upheaval since 
the inception of the Weimar Republ ic. Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist
12 League, W .E .5 ., 1932/33, p. 227.
i q
°The term "foreign exchange" will be dealt with in detail later. For 
now, a simple definition of "goods for goods" will suffice.
14 One of the chief goals of the new Nazi Regime in Germany was to 
escape devaluation of the mark. The new government feared that devaluation 
would be interpreted by the German people as a sign of another ineffective govern­
ment. It must be remembered that at this early stage, the National Socialist Party 
still faced stern competition at home.
1 RS. E. Harris, Exchange Depreciation (Cambridge; Harvard University 
Press, 1936), p. 202.
5
Party gained control of the country. The nation's internal economic situation was
perhaps the ma|or factor contributing to the political unrest that existed within the
Reich. Germany, which experienced the depression in a most acute way, was
particularly slow in showing signs of economic recovery. O f the six largest indus-
trial nations in the world* Germany proved to be the only one not to show a slight
16
increase in 1932 over the previous year in the quantum of imports and exports. 
Seeking relief from the economic chaos, a rapidly increasing portion of the popu­
lation enthusiastically lent their support to Hitler's barrage of promises. The 
Fuehrer's program called for the complete reorganization of the Reich. On May 1,
1933, the Nazi leader launched an extensive public works program. The immediate
17aim was the reduction of the vast numbers of unemployed within the country.
The following day, May 2, all labor and trade unions became nationalized, under
18
the control of the Party. The following February, the Reich enacted a "Law to
Prepare the Organic Reconstruction of the German Economy," enabling the Nazis
19to regulate all types and quantity of German industrial output. in its efforts to
16 League, W .E .S ., 1933/34, p. 227.
7̂ At the time of Hitler's accession to power, there were from six to seven 
million unemployed in Germany. See: Vaso Trivanovitch, Economic Development 
of Germany under National Socialism (New York City: National Industrial Con­
ference Board, Inc., 1937), p. 6 .
18 Trivanovitch, p. 9.
Gustaf Stolper, The German Economy, 1870 to the Present (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, In c ., 1967), p . 139.
6
stimulate the lowest agricultural index since 1913, the Reich at the same time
20
assumed complete control over that aspect of the economy,
The man chosen to guide the Reich in Hitler's program of "organic reco-
21 22 
very" was Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, appointed as Minister of
23
Economic Affairs. (In the early thirties he already had shown the economic
24feasibility of a totalitarian movement by making the following remarks:)
. . . the secret of financing Germany's political and 
economic tasks lies in a centralized and rigid concentration 
of the whole public and private activities of the German Reich, 
that is, public finance as well as private economy. This 
concentration is on Impossible within a state based on 
authoritarian rules.
20 Robert A . Brady, The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism (New  
York: The Viking Press, 1937), p. 225.
9 i The term "organic recovery" refers to recovery of every aspect of 
Germany's economic situation.
r\ry
A former president of the Reich shank, Schacht had resigned in 1931 
over a dispute concerning payment of the Young Plan installments. Hitler reap­
pointed him to the post in 1933. In 1934 he was also given the portfolio of 
Minister of Economics. At no time was Schacht a member of the Nazi Party. He 
was acquitted at the Nuremberg Trials.
^ T h e  actual head of the Reich's economic recovery program was Herman 
Gb'ring, and consequently Schacht's position was actually subordinate. Schacht's 
refusal to join the Nazi Party probably explained the titular head of the recovery 
program being given to Goring.
O A
Schacht's sympathy towards a totalitarian government does not neces­
sarily refer to the Nazi Party. Viewing the situation from strictly an economic 
viewpoint, a totalitarian government, to him, was the most feasible.
9 c
3 Amos E. Simpson, Hjalmar Schacht in Perspective (Paris: Mouton 
and C o ., Printers, 1969), p. 82.
7
After 1933, Dr*. Schacht's control -over business activity became absolute. 
When he assumed his duties, the Reich's debt, not including direct foreign invest­
ments within Germany, foreign owned bonds, or foreign owned private real estate,
26was over RM. 4 .9  billion. O f this RM. 2 .2  billion were short-term debts that
27had matured one month prior to Schacht's appointment.
An enormous task faced Hitler, Schacht qnd other members of the govern­
ment in their efforts to rehabilitate the German economy. A high rate of unem­
ployment, a faltering production output, an unstable currency, the tight money 
and scarce markets due to tariffs were problems that seemed insurmountable.
To be sure, the Reich was not alone in its economic difficulties. The 
world-wide depression and its immediate effects were equally as dire in the coun­
tries of Southeastern Europe. Several factors explained the depressed status
and the slow recovery of the Balkan States. One of the area's chief problems
28was rural overpopulation and the low production ability of the farmer. In
2^ Brady, p. 242.
27 National Industrial Conference Board, The Situation in Germany at 
the Beginning of 1933 (New Y ork:; National Industrial Conference Board, Inc.,  
1933), p. 9 . Hereafter cited as N .I.C  .B ., Situation in Germany.
28 In 1930, 61 .5 per cent of the rural population in Yugoslavia was regarded 
as "surplus," 53 per cent in Bulgaria, 51 .4 per cent in Rumania, and 50.3  per cent 
in Greece. For a detailed graph of the chronic situation, see: L. S , Stavrianos,
The Bajkans Since 1453 (New York: Rinehart and C o ., Inc.,  1958), p. 596.
8
general, one Balkan farmer grew enough for 1.5 persons while in countries of
r 29
western; Europe, the ratio was one to four.
The problem was compounded by the adoption of protective measures by
30other European countries to protect their own agricultural production. Due to 
the more highly mechanized farming methods of overseas producers, Balkan farmers 
found themselves undersold on the world market. Consequently, the agrarian sec­
tor of Southeastern Europe found itself unable to compete with western European 
cereal producers at world market price levels,
31
Even before Hitler's advent, the countries ofSoutheastern Europe had
found themselves on a veritable treadmill. The primary problem was overpopula-
32
tion in relation to their productivity. This resulted in low agricultural incomes.
29 Ib id ., p. 59. "population pressure" (the number of people dependent 
upon one acre of land) is not incompatible with agricultural prosperity. As a case, 
one can look at the Netherlands, where 81.7 population pressure exceed Rumania 
(79.7, the highest in the Balkans). Yet the Netherland's income and standard of 
living far exceeded the Balkans. The key to the problem is productivity,
30 N .I .C .B . ,  , Situation in Germany, p. 18
31 For purposes of space, this paper deals primarily with Rumania, 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and-Greece . Albania, largely accepted as a sphere of 
Italy, is dealt with peripherally. Turkey is ignored altogether.
22Royal Institute of International Affairs Southeastern Europe: A 
Political and Economic Survey, (London; Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 184, 
Hereafter cited as: S <ET "The population of Southeastern Europe had risen 
from 46 million in 1920 to 54 million in 1933.
9
A drastic r-eduction in the national income curtailed economic development in 
other areas. Protective Import and immigration quotas by foreign countries,
33when added to all of the above, clearly left the Balkan States in a quandary.
The greatest problem of the Balkans, however, was the inability of the respective
34governments to relieve the people of their plight,
Political instability made attempts to alleviate the economic situation
very difficult. The Draconian peace settlements at the end of World War I also
seriously affected the political rapport among the Balkan States, Bulgaria was
particularly embittered. The Treaty of Neuilly (November 27, 1919) had given
35
Southern Dobrudja to Rumania and Western Thrace to Greece. The Bulgars 
also had lost 975 square miles of their most strategic areas to Yugoslavia, which
qz
included access to the vital Belgrade-Saloniki Railway network, The result of
37the treaty was to alienate Bulgaria from the other Balkan States. The harsh 
impositions on Bulgaria by the victorious nations would one day return to haunt 
the other Balkan States. The Neuilly Treaty was to be the main factor
^  L, -k. Stavrianos, p , 597,
34 Ibid., p. 598.
35 Ibid,
36 Greece did offer; Bulgaria a trade Outlet to the Aegean Sea but Bulgaria 
refused, preferring to nurse a grievance rather than accept a settlement and injure 
their resettlement claims. See: Stavrianos, p, 579,
07° In addition, Bulgaria was saddled with a 450 million dollar reparation 
settlement. She was also forced to limit the size of her arrriy to 53,000 men.
38in the failure of the inter-Balkan conferences during the thirties. Bulgaria's 
dominqnt policy concerning her relationship with other Balkan countries was 
directed towards territorial revision. In short, Bulgaria's revisionist aims 
divided the southeastern European states at precisely the moment when unity was 
needed the most.
The Balkan States failed to draw together and barter as a single unit, 
Instead, each country dealt with foreign competition individually, often working 
openly against one another, Throughout; the period, however, there were several 
attempts at Balkan unit.
A series of conferences began in 1930, The first convened in Athens in 
October. Little was accomplished because arguments concerning minority prob­
lems and revisionist disputes overshadowed economic discussions. A week prior
to the opening of the talks,Bulgaria decided not to participate at all because the
3 9
minorities question was not on the agenda. But Alexander Papanastassiou
persuaded the Bulgarian delegation to attend by promising that the minorities
40
situation would be discussed "in principle." But the assembly decided,
The loss of land was not the only difficulty established at Neuilly, 
Vast population changes caused problems not only for Bulgaria, but for countries 
receiving the land.
Former Premier of Greece, head of the First and Third Balkan 
Conferences.
^  R, J . Kerner a nd H , N . Ho ward, The Balkan Conferences and the 
Balkan Entente, 1930-1935 (Berkeley: University of'California Press, 1936), 
p. 30. "
against 'Bulgaria's wishes, to place the minorities question on the agenda for a
second conference . Although all controversial issues were thereby carefully
avoided, the talks failed to achieve any progress contributing to economic cooper-
41
ation among the Balkan States, These shortcomings were primarily due to the
disputes on the minorities question. In fact, the most significant accomplishment
of the conclave was agreement concerning the agenda of a second conference,^
The second Balkan conference met in Istanbul in January, 1931.
. 43
Bulgaria's animosity toward Yugoslavia again contributed to the failure of this
44meeting. In his speech to the representatives during the early discussions,
Mohammed Konitza, head of the Albanian delegation stated?
When one wishes to build a house, one does not begin with 
the doors and windows, but with the foundation, and the foun­
dation of the common house we wish to bui|d is the equitable 
settlement of the rights of minorities,4^
One of the few times that the minorities and revisionist questions were 
mentioned on the floor of the conference discussions was in Konitza's speech.
4  ̂ Ib id ,, p . 47.
42 Ibid.
4^ Yugoslavia was against the formation of a tariff union among the 
Balkan States, about the only thing on the agenda that Bulgaria did approve of.
The two nations were also at odds over joint border claipis,
44 Norman J , Pa del ford, Peace in the Balkans (New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1 9 3 5 )> p ,l l .
4 5
Kerner and Howard, p. 51.
12
During this congress, attention was cpven to the possibility of the formation of a
Balkan union. A controversy over the value of such a confederation developed
between Yugoslavia and Greece. Professor Th. Georgevich, ̂  prominent
member of the Yugoslav delegation, believed the idea of a political union to be 
47premature. Papanastassiou, while dis disclaiming the need for economic rap­
prochement, vigorously supported the proposals for multilateral political discus-
48
sions among the Balkan States. The fate of the conference was sealed on the 
second day of the sessions when Mr. Papanastassiou rejected any proposals for
49treaty revision for the remainder of the talks. Heated debates over minority
Issues were already occurring at the meetings. Albania accused Yugoslavia of i l (
treatment towards the minority groups. The Bulgarian delegation again unleashed
50its hostile disposition on Yugoslavia over territorial disputes.
46
Dr. Georgevich, Yugoslavia’s foremost economic expert, believed 
economics to be the root of almost every Balkan problem. He postulated that a 
Balkan bank would not only lead to an inter-Balkan customs association but stimu­
late a general southeastern European agricultural recovery. In this way, he 
reasoned, harmony among the states would branch out into all aspects of political 
and commercial intercourse. Sees Kerner and Howard, The Balkan Conferences, 
p. 49.
47 Kerner and Howard, p. 49.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
5 0 Ib id ., p . .52.
13
For a second time, the post-war settlements thwarted an attempt at
Balkan unity. The achievements of the Second Balkan Conference were negligible,
-The meager accompl ishments of the conclave were limited aehievements related
to inter-Baikan railway and telephone communications, postal cooperation and
51mutual protection and guarantee of agricultural products. The delegations
52
also approved a proposal calling for diplimatic discussions at regular intervals,
53
Economically, the conference achieved nothing of importance.
The Third Balkan Conference, held in Bucharest in October, 1932 
proved even less successful than the two previous meetings. Boundary claims 
and minority disputes erupted before the opening ceremonies were completed. On
54
October 21, the Bulgarian delegation presented M . Ciceo Pop with a letter
55announcing its withdrawal from the talks. The Albanian representatives
51 It must be mentioned here that in conjunction with the main conference 
at Istanbul, an agricultural conference of the same nations was held in Sophia, 
Bulgaria. -The conference dealt primarily with agricultural research collaboration 
and studied the possibilities of alleviating barriers to an inter-Baikan Customs 
Union, The refusal of Yugoslavia to participate in the discussions lessened the 
conference's effectiveness and ultimately caused its failure. Sees Kerner and 
Howard, The Balkan Conferences, p. 48. See alsos Arnold J, Toynbee, Survey 
of International Affairs, 1931. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1932), pp. 324 -329 ,J
^  Kerner and Howard, p . 65.
^^The major economic achievement was the founding of a Balkan Tobacco 
Office to coordinate and adapt tobacco production to the needs of the world 
market.
~*v\Ciceo Pop, President of the Rumanian Chamber of Deputies, head of 
the Rumanian delegation, was chosen as President of the Third Balkan Conference.
Stanley Evans, A Short History of Bulgaria (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, Ltd ., 1960), p. 171.
14
threqtned a similarboycott if discussion*)! theminoritiesquestion was not placed
56
on the agenda. The delegates , without Bulgaria's participation, approved the
formulation of a Balkan pact that would take into consideration problems of 
minority groups and revisionist claims. This was the most significant accomplish­
ment of the third conference.
57In November, 1933, Balkan representatives met in Salonika for a 
58
fourth congress. It accomplished little more than the three previous ones. The
most important accomplishment of the meeting was an agreement by the delegates
to meet again and to formulate a Balkan pact.
-The underlying factor in the failure of the four congresses was Bulgaria's
refusal to accept the Neuilly Treaty as final. The Bulgars vehemently opposed
59any proposal that called for recognition of the status quo.
56
The Albanian delegation did withdraw temporarily but, unlike 
Bulgaria, left observers. Within four days, Albania returned to the Congress.
See: Kerner and Howard, The Balkan Conferences, p. 75.
57
The conference was originally scheduled for September, but trouble 
between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over boundary disputes postponed the opening for 
two months. See; Kerner and Howard, The Balkan Conferences, p, 95.
58 Private bilateral discussions between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were 
held in conjunction with the regular conferences. This was the only wgy in which 
the Bulgars could be induced to send a delegation to Salonika. See: Kerner and 
Howard, The Balkan Conferences, p. 96,
'^Stavrianos, p .738.
15
In February, 1934, a final attempt at southeastern European unity occurred
with the signing of the Balkan Pact by representatives of Greece, Yugoslavia,
60
Turkey and-Rumania . The pact was later transformed into the Balkan Entent.
It provided the participating governments with some measure of unity but Bulgaria's 
refusal to participate weakened the pact. The Balkan Entente achieved precisely 
the opposite results that the four conferences had intended. The congresses' ini-’ 
tiaI objective was inter-Balkan unify, achieved by lessening Bulgaria's problems. 
However, in failing to reach a detente concerning revisionist claims and minority 
disputes, the conclaves met with little success. The Entente, an offshoot of the
61
conferences, had , as its basic premise, maintenance of the post-war status quo.
As any idea of the sort was unacceptable to the Bulgars, the signing of the Balkan 
Pact left Southeastern Europe-divided more than ever. Bulgaria was isolated from 
the rest of the Balkans.
Instead of forminga homogenous unit to fight the encroachment of foreign 
nations, the Balkan countries chose to operate as single units. Inter-Balkan dis­
putes, primarily caused by the bitter disputes between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia 
about the boundary settlements made at the end of World War I, pitted the coun­
tries against one another. The four Balkan Conferences had achieved nothing.
The offshoot of the conferences, the Balkan Pact, was ineffective. In fact, the
^  Ibid., p. 738.
16
Pact did more harm than good. It split Southeastern Europe into two camps. By 
the end of 1933, the Balkan States, as far as unity was concerned, were in a worse 
position than they had been when the conferences began.
The German Reich was also in a condition of economic instability in 1933. 
The world was gradually emerging from the years of the depression, but Germany, 
saddled by war reparations and outstanding debts during the period, was slower to 
emerge from the depths of the economic recession of 1929-1931 .
The formation of international currency blocs further isolated both 
Germany and Southeastern Europe from the world market. It was this impediment 
that would soon awaken both areas to the advantages of economic cooperation.
CHAPTER II
REORIENTATION OF THE REICH'S COMMERCIAL POLICY
The deterioration of German diplomatic ties with the West was to be 
a determining factor in the shift in emphasis to Southeastern Europe. The political 
differences between Germany and the western democracies brought about a com­
plete reorganization of Nazi: Germany's commercial policy.
As early as April, 1933, public opinion in the United States and 
Great Britain showpd a great deal of misgivings concerning the Nazi Regime.
The Reich's treatment of Jews produced a wave of indignation in both countries. 
The feeling was also expressed at the diplomatic level, as on April 12, 1933, the 
German Ambassador to Great Britain, Leopold von Hoesch, warned the Reich
Foreign Ministry that: " . . .  in recent weeks Germany has lost an extraordinary
1
amount of ground in England." Hoesch talked with Great Britain's Sir John 
2
Simon, who told him:
. . . it  was an undeniable fact that Germany has lost 
a great deal of sympathy in England during the past few 
weeks, and precisely with the very persons who had 
formerly been staunch advocates of Germany. The British 
government regretted this exceedingly, since it disrupted 
its policy.^
United States Department of State, Documents on German Foreign 
Policy, 1918-1945 (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1953), Series 
"C", Vol. I . ,  p. 282. Hereafter cited as: D. Ger. F .P ,
2 British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
3 P . Ger. F .P ., Ser. "C", V o l. I , ,  p . 282.
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Resentment in the United States towards Germany's anti-Semitic poi i — 
cies closely paralleled that in Great Britain. A remark made by Secretary of 
State Stimson in March, 1933, revealed the concern of the United States Govern­
ment with Germany's anti-semitic policies: "While this government is disinclined
to lend credence to the reports (of Jewish persecution), it is causing widespread
4
distress among a large section of the American people."
The feelings of hostility aroused over the treatment of the Jews affected
the success of discussions concerning other matters. In August, 1933, von Ho esc h
described the danger of the strained commercial relations between Great Britain and
Germany in his report to the German Foreign Ministry. This report also discussed
the Anglo-German relationship as being:
. . . worse in financial circles, where apart from every­
thing else, an unfavorable effect is caused . . .  by danger of 
the loss of financial transactions with Germany and . . .  by 
(the) anxiety concerning a further deterioration in the business 
situation through threatening political complications.^
The greatest rift between Germany and the West was one which had
both political and economic consequences. It occurred in June, 1933, when the
Reich cabinet approved a law calling for a complete Transfer M o r a to r iu m In
United States Department of State,-Foreign Relations of the United 
States (Washington: : Government Printing Office', 1933), V o l. I I . ,  p. 320. 
Hereafter cited as:: F .R. of U .S .
5 D .G er. F .P ,, Ser. "C ", V o |. 11. ,  p . 753.
^ Ibido> Ser, "C", Voi . 1 , ,  p. 343.
19
sessense, Act provided for an indefrnite postponement of payments on the
7 8■: Dawes and Young loans. Sir Eric Phipps described Schacht's defense of the 
Moratorium in a speech to the Diplomatic Corps as "very badly received by the
9non-German section of the audience
That same month, Scherpenberg was sternly rebuffed in his attempt
to follow Schacht's plan to establish clearing agreements concerning trade regula-
11
tions with Great Britain, Von Hoesch wrote the Reich Foreign Office in 
Berlin that:
(The British Government) drew attention to the great 
irritation caused in Britain by Germany’s announcement 
that she was postponing her transfers in respect to the 
Reich government's loan, bonds of which were held (in 
Britain) among all sections of the population as investment 
securities. ^
^The interest on the Dawes loan due to Great Britain at the time of 
the Moratorium was- RM. 845 million, plus a redemption service of RM 3.2 million, 
See: : D. G er. F .P ., Ser. "G" , V o lS e r . "C ", Vol . I I I ,  p . 91.
g
British Ambassador to Germany, August, 1933 -  April, 1937.
9
Great Britain, Documents on British Foreign Pol icy, 1919- 1939 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), Second Series, V o l. V I ., 
p. 774.
^  Schacht's son-in-law, and Secretary of the Legation at the German 
Embassy in London.
11 0fS ta te , P ..G er. F .P . , Ser. "C", V o l. Il l ,  p. 21.
^  Ibid., p .,51.
The British Government immediately retaliated by drastically curtailing German
imports. The tariff was called, "The Debts Clearing Office Import Restrictions 
13
A ct."
In October, 1933 another problem arose which produced not only dip­
lomatic and military complications but formed the basis for a major economic 
division between Germany and the West. Diplomats and economists from France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States, deadlocked at the Geneva 
Disarmament Conference since early January, heard Hitler's special envoy 
announce: mWe shall have to leave both the Disarmament Conference and the
League of Nations, since the condition that we be recognized as a nation with
14
equality of rights is not fulfilled. "
A t the end of 1933, Germany's relations with the western decocracies 
was comparable to the immediate post-war era. It is possible that the Moratorium 
was the primary factor responsible for the strained economic relationship between 
the Reich and the West, although its withdrawal from the League certainly
1 *3°The Reich further retaliated with a "Law an the Application of 
Measures for Reprisals Against Foreign Countries."  The statute gave the govern­
ment the power to regulate business with any country that, in the Nazi view, 
appeared to be discriminatory towards Germany. See: Department of State,
D. G er. F .P ., Ser. "C", V o l. I l l . ,  p . 86.
21
accelerated the diplomatic schism. Since it anticipated continued problems with 
the West, not only politically but economically, the Reich realized the necessity 
of reorientating its commercial policy.
In both theory and practice, German economic recovery paralleled
industrial output, with armament production the ultimate goal. Dr. Schacht
15
believed that the manufacture of weapons was the most useful expenditure.
The industrialization program in the early years of 1933 and 1934 
achieved Schacht's immediate aim. During this period, unemployment fell 
sharply while the national income greatly increased. The total net income went 
from RM. 45.2 billion in 1932, reached RM. 46.6 billion in 1933 and then 
soared to RM, 52.7 billion in 1934 ,^  The armament expenditure wasRM.
17
1.6 billion at the end of 1933 and rose to RM. 9 .8  billion by the end of 1935.
Dr. Schacht felt that a vast rearmament program would provide the 
quickest solution to Germany's unemployment problem. The relevance of rearma­
ment to the German economy was summarized by his statement to the London press 
corps in early 1935: "A country which was not arrried could not defend itself and
^Simpson, p . 90.
16
Office of the United States Chief of Council for Prosecution of 
Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, V o l. V I . (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 139. Hereafter cited as: N .C .A .
17 Kenyon Poole, German Financial Policies, 1932-39 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1939), p. 94,
22
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consequently, it would have no voice in the concert of Nations."
Dr. Schacht's "New Plan" for German foreign policy had two main
objectives; 1) to import nothing that could not be paid for from the proceeds of
19
exports, and 2) to regulate German imports to the basic national needs.
Schacht's plan included four methods of operation. The first provided for a 
"Clearing Agreement" with a foreign country. Using this device, the Reich 
cou|d predetermine the amount of trade with a country before transacting any com­
mercial agreement. The two countries would agree to sell identical amounts of
goods, and in this way both participants could avoid a surplus which would result
, • • 20 in a deficiency of accounts.
The second method was known as the "Barter System." When this
device was used, Germany and another country would exchange a certain product
of one type for a specified amount of another. Importers and exporters then
21
received compensation from clearing houses. When the third device, "Import
18 International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals 
Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945 -  October 1, 1946, Vol . X II, (Germany, Nuremberg, 
1949), p. 476. Hereafter cited as: I .M .T .
stockpiling.
19 Simpson, p. 93. This, of course, changed when the Reich began
20 Poole, p. 143. See following footnote.
21 Ibid. The producers and eventual exporters were paid for their goods 
by their own governments. Consequently, only goods and no money crossed the 
border. This was an integral part of Schacht's plan. Any surplus of goods going 
into the Balkans merely increased the amount of the Reich's credit in that country. 
In this way, the Reich often violated its agreement in exchanging production 
amounts equal in value.
23
Licensing" was employed, only goods vital to German production and livelihood 
22
entered the Reich. The fourth and final modus operandi was known as the 
"Export Subsidy Turnover Assessment Law." This guise further regulated the flow 
of trade and also provided a tax schedule for certain imports. To obtain needed 
vital materials, German exporters drastically cut their prices below both the 
foreign market prices and their own production costs. After the exporters obtained 
the needed materials, they received a rebate from the equalization fund created by 
forced contributions from the entire industry under the terms of the Export Subsidy
23
Turnover Assessment.
Schacht's economic policy also resorted to the utilization of "Blocked 
Marks. 1 Foreigners who owned funds within Germany were forbidden to transfer 
them outside the Reich, Entrapped within Germany, the notes on the funds pro­
vided a quick profit for German investors. ^ Schacht's position enabled him to
raise the rate of discount (sometimes as high as fifty per cent) and resell the notes
25
to German speculators. Thus, foreign creditors lost while German specu lators
22 By this device, a list of items drawn up compelled each importer to 
check with his local clearing house for its approval before bringing items into the 
country. See; Poole, German Financial Policies, p. 144.
23 . i Ibid.
24
Vaso Trivanovitch, Economic Development of Germany under 
National Socialism (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, Inc,
1937), p. 105.
2 5 I .M .T . ,  V o l. XXXVI, p, 516.
24
profited. The government, in turn, placed a tax on the profits realized by the 
discounts.
- Dr. Schacht tightened his grip on German foreign trade even further
26
when he introduced the "Aski-Mark." With these an exporter who sold goods
to Germany was paid in a special issue of marks that could be used only as pay-
27
ment for other German products. The value of the Aski-Marks varied from
country to country and were non-negotiable outside the nation in which they 
28first were issued. The advantages of these marks were twofold: 1) Reich 
manufacturers had complete control over the prices of their products in a foreign 
country. German marketers could undersell, depending on the competition, or 
raise the prices at w ill, as the marks were good only for German products; 2) 
the German exporters could force the value of the "Aski-Marks" down by res­
tricting the type of products or by manipulating the prices of goods within a coun­
try. The profit was realized when the "Aski-Marks" began to reappear within
29
Germany at a mark-up in value.
Under Schacht's plan, Germany abandoned the entire system of multi­
lateral trade. There were three reasons for this: 1) Germany had no desire to
26 Blocked Marks differed from Ask‘~Marks in that Blocked Marks were 
restricted entirely to internal Germany, while Aski-Marks (essentially the same 
thing) were used in foreign countries.
^Trivanovitch, p. 166.
28c. Q,Simpson, p. 97.
29 ibid.
25
expand trade with countries whose economic structure resembled her own; 2) the 
Reich wished to develop a sound economic relationship with countries that com­
plemented her own, and 3) German trade relations with western Europe and the
30
United States showed a continual decline. Prior to Schacht's involvement,
Germany's total trade with the United States alone dropped from $254 million in
31
1929 to $176 million in 1930. By the end of 1933, the amount had not yet
32
reached the $200 million level.
There were numerous reasons for the Reich's economic interest in the 
Balkans. Most important was Germany's trouble with the West. The foreign 
trade policy of Great Britain and the United States made it necessary for the Reich 
to seek commerce with nations who were willing to sell their products without 
payment in the normal foreign exchange bills. The Balkans' inability to compete 
with western Europe on the world market made them much more accessible to Ger­
man trade overtures.
The Reich's trade with countries who had formerly provided her with
33
her main sources of raw materials showed a steady decline. The following table
30Basch, p. 171,
31 United States Tariff Commission, Compilation of Data on United 
States Trade with Germany (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), 
page V . Hereafter cited as U.S.T ,C .
32lb id ., p. V II.
3 3 Basch, p. 46.
26
illustrates the continued decrease of her overseas supplies.
Table 2 34
Decrease in the Riech's Overseas Suppl ies 0934-36)
RM. (i n m il { io n s ) % Of Total Imports
Year
Im p o rts  from  :
1934 1935 1936 1934 1935 1936
United States 373 241 232 8 ,4 5 r8 $ .5
British Dominions 264 121 127 5 .9 2 ,4 3 ,0
Netherlands & France 132 120 113 3 .0 2 ,9 2 .7
Argentina 152 143 119 3 .4 3 ,4 2 .8
T o ta ls 921 625 591 20.7 15.0 14.0
The year 1935 showed an increase in the Reich's economic ambitions
in Southeastern Europe. In that year, German imports increased from 248 to 319
million or by 29% and exports to the Balkans rose from 171 to 252 million marks,
35a respectable 40% increase. During the same period, imports from Germany's 
heretofore largest suppliers of raw materials, mainly the United: States, Canada
34 Ibid., p. 40.
35
League of Nations, Review of World Trade, 1933-1937 (Genova: 
1934-1938), 1935, p. 38. ^  "
27
and Great Britain, declined from RM. 576.6 to RM. 292.5 million, nearly a 50%
j  36decrease.
Southeastern Europe represented an ideal and logical choice for
German economic exploitation. The Balkan area fit perfectly into the Nazi plan
lor economic penetration since Germany, even during the depression years, had
37
been the chief supplier of goods for these countries. These factors helped the
Reich to gain unlimited credit in the area .
A look at the production possibilities of the Balkan States prompted
the Nazi Government to make a great effort to exploit the potential of those
38
countries . Schacht himself directed a trade offensive into the Balkans. He
understood the necessity of gaining economic control of the Balkan States, A
study of the resource possibilities of the area showed that complete domination of
the countries would result in an end to the Reich's foodstuff shortage- Statistics
revealed that control of Southeastern Europe's grain and cereal production would
39
overcome Germany's annual deficit of 41 million metric quintals. Similar
36 Ibid.
37 Gerhard Schacher, Germany Pushes Southeast; (London: Hurst and 
Blackett, 1937), p. 147.
38
Hjalmar H . G . Schacht, Confessions of the "Old Wizard,"
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956), p. 303. Schacht's personal joprney 
to the Balkan capitals will be discussed in Chapter III.
39 A quintal is approximately the equivalent of a hundredweight,
28
studies also revealed that Balkan natural resources could greatly alleviate the
Reich's need for raw materials (particularly oil from Rumania), The deficit, in
fact, would change to a surplus, as the yearly average from southeast Europe's
production (not including that retained for domestic consumption) was approxi-
40
mately 46 million metric quintals.
By mid-1935, Germany's timber requirements reached about 44.5  
million metric quintals per annum, The combined annual Balkan timber produc­
tion approximated 38 million metric quintals. Southeastern Europe also possessed 
the capability of ameliorating the Reich's annual thirteen million metric quintals
41
bauxite requirement. (Yugoslavia alone exported eight million m,g. annually).
In addition to this, Yugoslavia and Rumania could fulfill Germany's need for 2.75
42
million tons of copper ore per year.
Germany was the largest importer of hides in Europe. The Reich pur-
43
chased nearly 110,000 metric tons yearly, mostly from South America, The
Balkan production, led by Greece, produced approximately 85,000 metric tons 
44
per annum.
Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions 
in Germany to March, 1936 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936), 
p . 175. Hereafter clted as: Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade,
41 Ib id,, p. 151
4^ The Economist, Nov. 5 , 1938, p. 266,
43 Cleona Lewis, Nazi Europe and World Trade (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 1941, p, 18.
44 Ibid., p. 266* The German need for leather was acute. A 
shortage existed in the manufacture of shoes, upholstering, etc.
29
- For Germany, the search for oil resources received top priority as
early as mid-1935. This was because of Germany's rearmament program and her
increase in the production of industrial machinery. By the end of 1936, the
45
Reich had imported over 3 .7  million metric tons of crude and refined o i l .
Germany's oil requirement ranged from 30 to 40 million m .q. per year but
• 46 •Rumania had only supplied at most, 10 million m .q . annually. On the basis
47
of a report issued by Dr . Funk, Director of the State Institute of Geology,
48
Germany was willing to invest and assist in sinking additional wells in Rumania .
Basing his information on conducted tests, D r. Funk estimated that Rumanian oil
49
deposits could range from between 105 to 110 million tons of o il. Foreign
interest in Rumanian oil fields, particularly on the part of Great Britain and
France, prompted the Reich's plan for speedy exploitation of Rumania's oil 
50
trade.
45 Ib id., p . 98
^  Gfeat Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, p . 179.
47
Dr. Walter Funk replaced Hjalmar Schacht as Minister of Economics 
in November, 1937 when the latter fell out of favor with Hitler
48 ,
The Economist, Nov. 5, 1938, p. 266.
49
S .E .E ., p, 196. The publishers quote these figures using other 
sources, but go into somewhat of a disagreement with them, saying that Funk's 
figures are too high.
50 Ibid., pp. 129-135.
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An extensive program of trade withSoutheastem Europe also promised
relief to Germany's cotton and wool deficiencies. Trade in these products showed
a remarkable shift. When the New Plan was first initiated, three-quarters of
Germany's imported cotton came from the United States. By the beginning of
51
1936, however, the figure was less than one-quarter and was still declining.
Germany began her plan of economic penetration in southeastern
5
Europe by taking advantage of the Balkan's surplus of raw materials and foodstuffs. 
The first goal of the Reich was to obtain more credit with the Balkan countries. 
Germany initiated its plan by offering the Balkan producers prices five to ten per
53cent above the current world market prices. - Finding difficulty in securing 
markets and unable to compete with the lower price indexes offered by western 
Europe and the United States, the countries of southeastern Europe had no choice 
but to accept the prices offered by the Reich . The high prices paid for Balkan 
goods greatly enhanced the image of Germany in the eyes of the peasants of the 
countries. Germany's popularity with the agrarian class in the Balkans made it 
very difficult for the governments of southeastern Europe to decrease trade with 
Germany. If trade was discouraged, the Balkan governments feared strong
5 1 Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, p. 159.
5 2 Basch, p. 174.
5 3 S .E .E ., p. 196.
31
54opposition at home. This factor did a great deal to make the Reich successful.
Germany continued to tighten her grip on the Balkan countries. The 
second phase of Schacht's plan was to dictate the amount, quality, and terms of 
trade within the Balkan area. In March of 1935, the Reich began tp increase its 
absorption of Balkan products, having already gained access to any amount of credit 
it desired in the area.
The effect of these plans resulted in an enlargement of the Reich's debt 
to the Balkan countries. By March of 1935, the German indebtedness to southeas­
tern Europe had reached a total of RM. 567 million, an increase of RM, 127 m il-
56lion from the same date in 1934. The German policy of purchasing goods from
the Balkan area at higher prices greatly influenced the shift in Balkan economic
p i icy. As creditor nations, they sought as quick a return on their loans as possible.
Acceptance of German products represented the mpst immediate tangible method.
Decreasing their importation from western Europe and the United States, the Balkans
57
increased their purchases from the Reich. The following table illustrates the tre­
mendous upswing in commercial activity between Germany and Southeastern 
Europe.
54
Schacher, p. 150
55 iw d .
^^Basch, p. 175, 
57
Ib id ., p, 174.
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Table 3
Trade Statistics Between Germany and the Balkans
1933 -  1936
imports (from S .E. Europe) In RM. (mi|l ions) Exports to (S.E. Europe)
1933 1934 1935 1936 1933 1934 1935 1936
Bulgaria 31 34 41 58 18 19 40 48
Greece 53 55 59 68 19 29 49 63
Rumania 46 59 80 92 46 51 64 104
Yugoslavia 33 36 61 75 34 31 37 77
The percentage of Germany's total imports from Southeastern Europe rose
from six per cent in 1933 to 12 per cent in 1936 while exports to the Balkans rose
. 5 9from 3.9 per cent to 9 .5  per cent in the same period. By 1936, Germany 
accounted for approximately 50 per cent of the entire world trade of Southeastern 
Europe
Germany's economic policy towards Southeastern Europe took a sudden 
change in the latter part of 1935. Because of her indebtedness to the Balkan coun­
tries, the Reich was able to dictate trade policy between Germany and the Balkan 
countries. If Germany paid five to 10 per cent above world prices for Balkan pro­
ducts, it in turn marked up her own prices for exports destined to the Balkans by
^Schacher, p, 154
59 Ibid,
60 Ibid.
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20 to 30 per cent above world market prices.^ The smaller countries had no
62
choice but to accept. This was the only way in which they could lessen frozen 
German debts. The only thing that the southeastern countries could do was to pay 
the inflated prices to Germany in the hopes that they would be able to alleviate as 
much of the German debt as possible.^ Germany began to import more foodstuffs 
from the Balkan countries than it actually needed in order to increase Balkan depen­
dency on itself. The Reich also wished to stockpile for the future.
The Reich then began to regulate the type of commodities that it
exported to the Balkans. Germany broadened her export policy towards Southeastern
64Europe, -Besides flooding the Balkan market with manufactured goods, it began
to export outdated machinery to the Balkans. In this way, Germany was able to
65
rid herself of obsolete machinery, and increase Balkan dependency at the same
6 1 S ,E .E ., p. 196.
■ In 1935 several of the Balkan States attempted to break away from 
this but failed, largely due to the League sanction against Italy, depriving them 
(especially Yugoslavia) of a large portion of their trade. See; Basch, The Danube 
Basin, pp.179 -180 .
63S .E .E ., p. 196.
^ T h e  Balkan region had been, since 1930, a "dumping ground" for 
German exporters. The shipping of obsolete machinery to these countries came 
only after the Balkan markets were flooded with articles such as Leica cameras, 
mouth organs, aspirin, false teeth, cosmetics, toiletries, and certain medicines. 
This account, however, is questioned by the writers of S .E . E p .  196.
^  A favorite trick of the Germans was offering the machinery at very 
reduced prices, but skyrocketing the price for spare parts once the machine broke 
down.
34
6 6
time. 'With the machinery, the Reich assumed that the Balkan region would be 
able to improve its economic development, Thus,Southeastern Europe would be in 
a better position to aid Germany in fulfilling its need for raw materials for arma­
ment production.
The export of machinery was only-one method which the Germans used 
to coerce the Balkan countries into supplying the materials needed in the Reich 
economy. Germany also influenced a change in the type of crops produced in
67
southeastern Europe to those that would best supplement the Reich's deficiencies.
A German industrial firm, I .G .  Farben, Inc., received land grands in Rumania
68
and Bulgaria, These land grants totaled nearly 100,000 hectares. The land
69
was used exclusively for soya bean production and experiments-. At the time, 
Germany provided the lone market for the Balkan soya bean industry. The loss of 
a market for the soya crop affected the Rumanian and Bulgarian economy.
Germany extended her exploitation ofSoutheastern Europe. It gave 
the Balkan countries no other recourse but to trade with the Reich at whatever 
price she dictated. In this way, Germany could resell her Balkan imports to other
^Basch, p. 179.
^ Schacher, p. 193.
^ O n e  hectare =; 2.47 acres.
^ S o y a  beans were highly valuable to the Reich economy. From the 
seeds, a base additive was used in preparation of food that was to be stored for 
long periods pf time .
countries. .Thi& represents a pure profit as Germany merely -increased her indebted-
70
ness to the Bdlkans with no intent of repayment.
An opportunity for Germany to test Schacht's New Plan presented itself 
when economic sanctions were imposed on Italy by the League of Nations. This 
sanction was imposed-because of Italy's aggressive action in Ethiopia . Yugoslavia, 
Italy's main customer in Ssutheastern Europe, chose to obey the sanctions. The
sanctions, however, dealt a severe blow to the Yugoslavian economy. By choos-
71
ing to obey the sanctions, Yugoslavia lost 90 per cent of her exports to Italy.
The greatest loss to Yugoslavia was in its timber industry. Lumber exports to Italy
72
dropped from 371 million dinars in 1935 to 37.3 dinars in less than one year.
Yugoslavia, realizing the predicament caused by the loss of its chief 
customer, succeeded in gaining a few concessions from Great Britain and France. 
Britain's efforts were only half-hearted. She did allow certain quantities of eggs 
from Yugoslavia to enter her country duty-free. His Majesty's government also 
reduced the duty on turkeys and chickens and increased her quota of Yugoslav
73
bacon. The total value of Britain's concessions to Yugoslavia approached the
^Schacher, p. 163.
7lBasch, p. 192.
72lbid.
73 j . n 0pfrner/ Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-41 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1962), p. 99.
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neighborhood of 100 million dinars. The Yugoslav government fared worse with
France. French importers continued to do most of their timber buying from non-'
sanctionist Austria rather than buy timber from Yugoslavia. The total increase in
7 5
French purchasing from Yugoslavia amounted to eleven head of horses. The
total amount of concessions granted by Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, and France
covered no more than 25 per cent of Yugoslavia's export losses. This meant that
76
Yugoslav exporters sustained a 500-600 million dinar loss in a single year.
The German Foreign Office wasted little time in talking advantage of
the opportunities presented by the League sanction. On March 27, 1936, Carl 
77
Clodius attended an economic conference at Zagreb, Yugoslavia and reported:
The negotiations have led to our reaching an objective 
for which we have striven for a year: The Yugoslav govern­
ment is now prepared . . . .  to undertake a large scale shift 
over of total imports and purchases from Germany . . .
This would mean that the German share of Yugoslavia's imports 
would rise to more than a third and that the German govern­
ment would obtain the predominating position in the Yugoslav 
market which Italy held for fifteen years.7®
74 Ibid.
75 ,U;Ibid.
7^ ’Basch, p. 193.
7 7 Carl Clodius, head of the Economic Policy Division, Department 
of the German Foreign Ministry.
7 8 P . Ger. F .P ., "C", Vol. V . ,  p. 318.
Thd same month, Krupp, the great munitions and steel producers from
Germany, received two separate contracts^ The first contract called for a 160-
million dinar contract to convert the Zenica Iron Works in Bosnia into an armaments 
79plant. The second contract provided for the manufacture of bridge materials
80
for an extensive Yugoslav highway project. At the conference in Zagreb, the
yugoslavian government decided to place orders in Germany for railway materials
. 81 in order to use up as much of the balance owed to Yugoslav creditors as possible.
The most logical and the most practical solution to the problems of 
the Reich was for Germany to increase her economic involvement in Southeastern 
Europe, In 1935, therefore, the first of the two I'New Plans, " directed by Dr, 
Schacht, was initiated. These plans were designed to take advantage of obvious 
weaknesses in the Balkans and, therefore, Germany would be able to capitalize on
the Balkan resources that were vital to the German economy. The New Plan, in 
-effect, was designed to-destroy tbe system of multilateral trade in Europe.
The League of Nation's sanctions against Italy gave Germany its 
greatest opportunity to put its trading methods into operation. This opportunity, 
together with the reluctance of the West to concern itself in Balkan affairs, 
resulted in the economic capitulation of Yugoslavia, It also gave Germany a 
strategic economic advantage in her drive to gain control of the Southeast.
79 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International 
Affairs, 1936 (London: Oxford University Press, 1931-1941), p. 530,
80 Hoptner, 1934-41.
^  Survey of International Affairs, 1936, p. 530.
CHAPTER III
SCHACHT'S TOUR OF THE BALKANS
The Imposition of economic sanctions on Italy by the League of Nations 
changed the scope of the Reich's penetration and exploitation of Southeastern 
Europe . The League's action facilitated Germany's commercial aspirations in 
the area. The Balkan States ceased to be of secondary importance. Their expan­
ded role in the Reich economy became apparent when, in June, 1936, Dr, Schacht 
left for a tour of the Balkan capitals as a special emissary of both the Foreign 
Ministry and his own Ministry of Economics.
Dr. Schacht's first stop was Belgrade, Yugoslavia . The Germans had 
far-reaching motives for the tour, as the stop in Belgrade illustrated. As early as 
1933 von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, had outlined a scheme to high 
Nazi officials calling for extensive financial aid to Yugoslavia in order to gain 
political influence there in addition to maintaining it as an important market for 
German exports.
In Belgrade, Schacht showed his ability as a negotiator. On June
. . . .  2 .
12, 1936, M iliv je  Pilvja signed a treaty with Germany, greatly reducing
 ̂Schacher, p . 147.
9 Yugoslav Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs.
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Yugoslavia's trade with the Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States, and
3other countries. These trade restrictions were advantageous to Germany.
4
The Yugoslav Prime Minister, Milan Stoyadinovitch, said of the agreement;
5
"Today we are inaugurating a new Economic policy." Stoyadinovitch also 
agreed to permit Germany to send experts to examine the iron ore deposits of 
Lubidja. The Yugoslav Premier made very clear his intentions of ignoring the 
strong anti-German element in his country that had hindered Yugoslav-German 
trade relations.^ Charles S. Nelson, the United States Ambassador to Yugo-
h ■ '
slavia, wrote to the Secretary of State expressing his fear of " , . , Yugoslavia 
becoming the economic, and eventual I y, perhaps, the political satellite of 
; Germany. But at the present time, and under present conditions (I can) see no 
alternative course for (that) Country . . ."
The agreement provided that Yugoslavia would import only certain 
commodities, up to 35 per cent of its import volume, from non-clearing countries. 
The purpose was to cut imports from currency and foreign exchange countries and 
increase commerce with clearing countries, particularly her greatest clearing 
debtor, Germany?
^Survey of International Affairs, 1936, p . 530.
^Pro-Minister of Foreign Affairs.
^ Survey of International Affairs, 1936, p. 530,
^Hoptner,p* 101.
7 F.R. of U .S ., 1936, V o l. I . , p , 502.
8 Hoptner, p. 102.
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Germany's endeavors, prompted by the League sanctions, showed
immediate results in connection with Italy. Italian exports declined from 672
million dinars ($336 million) to 137 million ($66.5 million) from 1935 to 1936-^
Germany's investment in Yugoslavia during the same period rose from 55 million
10
dinars ($27.5 million) to 820 million ($410 million). The fable following on 
page 41 (Table 5) illustrates the overalI direction of Yugoslav trade from 1926 -  
1939,
Dr. Schacht's trip to Belgrade resulted in some impressive gains for
Germany. Above a ll, Italy ceased to be Yugoslavia's largest customer. In the
first half of 1935, Italy accounted for slightly more than 20 per cent of Yugoslavia's
total tra d e ,^  Germany only accounted for 16 per cent of Yugoslavia'? trade in
1935 but in the first half of 1936, Italy's share of the trade, as a result of the
League action, slipped to less than two per cent while Germany's share increased 
12
to over 25 per cent, "When he left Belgrade, Schacht expressed pleasure at the 
success of his visit. At their last meeting, Premier Stoyadinovitch related to the 
President of the Reichsbank that economic cooperation between Germany and 
Yugoslavia entailed his "firm intention of overcoming in the future more
^ Basch, p. 192.
I^Hoptner, p. 102,
1 ISurvey of International Affairs, 1936, p . 531,
1 2  Ibid.
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YUGOSLAV EXPORT -  IMPORT TRADE WITH SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
1926 -  1939
(annual averages in percentage of value of trade)
1926 -  1 930 1 931 -  1 935 1 936 -  1 9 3 9 °
Country Exports Imports(from) Exports Imports (from) Exports Imports (from)
France 3.4 4 .3 2 .4 4 .5 2 .8 2 .3
Great Britain 1.3 6 .0 3.3 8.6 8 .4 7 .5
C z ec ho si ovak ia 9.2 18.2 12.8 14.3 10.6 10.9
Rumania ..5 3.3 .6 2.2 .9 2.1
Greece 7.7 1.3 4.2 1.3 3 .4 1.5
Turkey 0.2 0.4 0 . - 0.1 ° * 2b
0.1
Austria 18.9 18.2 17.9 13.8 n . 4 b 9.2
Hungary 7 .0 5.7 4.5 4 .0 4 .2 3.4
Italy 25.8 12.2 21.4 12.9 7 .4 7 .8
Germany 10.4 14.2 14.1 16.0 28.3 34.8
T o t a l 84.4 83.8 81.3 77.7 77.6 79.6
a . Includesyear of League sanctions against Italy
b . Does not include 1939
^3 JJJ.Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-41 , (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 95-96.
successfully than hitherto the political obstacles in this sphere.
Schacht's second stop was Athens. His visit there required much more
caution than his trip to Belgrade . The Reich Minister accurately predicted a
more suspicious press in Athens than he had encountered in Belgrade. The
Messager d'Athens stated that his trip had more political reasons than economic 
15motives. Schacht's basis for opening Greco-German trade discussions was
understandable, as Germany was the largest market for Greek exports. The
exports over the past three years indicated that Greece had a favorable balance
16
of approximately 30 million Rm.-($12 million).
Schacht's goal lay primarily in the stimulation of non-agricultural
undertakings in Greece. The Reich faced its sternest competition in Greece
from Great Britain, and the German emissary presented a plan whereby the Reich
would match British investments in Thracian ore mining. Germany, he stated,
was willing to provide the capital and labor in return for a share of the hold- 
17
ings. Schacht's "package-deal" called fpr the placing of larger orders for 
manufactured goods from the Reich. The Greeks refused to negotiate until 
Schacht granted two concessions; 1) a guarantee against any accumulation of
14D . Ge r .  F . P . "C ", Vol .  V ,  p. 631. 
^Schacher, p. 227.
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debts on Germany's part, and 2) a guarantee against depreciation of the 
Reichmark.^®
As a result of the negotiations, at the beginning of 1937, a 230-million 
drachma (^33 mill ion) loan from Germany at three per cent interest was granted
19
to aid in the Greek rearmament program. Schacht's visit succeeded in that 
it laid the groundwork fora steady increase in trade between the two countries. 
Between 1930 and 1938, Greek exports to Germany increased from 23.-5 to 38,8  
per cent of the total from Germany rose from 10.1 to 28.8  per cent of Greece's 
total imports.^
Schacht's progress in obtaining economic gains for Germany was chal­
lenged somewhat at Bucharest, his third stop in the Balkans. Of all the Balkan 
countries, Rumania provided the most ardent resistance to German economic
encroachment. Rumania held out a year longer than the other Balkan countries
21
in accepting exchange controls, because she had a consistent export surplus
22and an adequate supply of gold in the Rumanian National Bank. The 
^Schacher, p. 172.
^Edward S. Forster, A Short History of Modern Greece, 1821-1956 
(New York: Frederick A . Praeger, 1958), p . 195.
4 Bickham Sweet-rEscott, Greece, A Political and Economic Survey, 
1939-1953, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954), p. 12,
21 Another term applied to the German economic policies concerning
trade.
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foremost task of the economic leaders in Rumania lay in the preservation of the 
value of the Lei. In the end, like her sister states, she succumbed to the insur­
mountable obstacles of foreign credit withdrawals, falling prices, and frozen
23debts in other countries. However, both internal and external political 
events affected economic policy.
24
Nicholas Titulescu's foreign policy was concerned with the mainten­
ance of close connections with France and the Little Entente against
Germany. His chief fear, the loss of land gained from the post-war-settlements,
25called for a pro-French policy against any form of treaty revision . Economic
ties between Rumania and France tightened. In February, France succeeded in
gaining a commercial agreement with Rumania that stated that, in return for
French armaments, the Rumanian government would grant France 750,000 tons
26of Rumanian oil per annum for a period of twelve years.
27However, in July, 1936, Titulescu resigned his post. The departure 
of the pro-French Prime Minister greatly facilitated the Reich's efforts towards
^Basch, p. 139.
n  i
Rumanian Prime Minister, Pro-French,
^H enry Roberts, Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 190.
^ Survey of International Affairs, 1936, p. 532.
^Titulescu's resignation stemmed from mounting pressure from rightist 
groups because of his pro-Russian policies, See; John A . Lukacs, The Great 
Powers"and Eastern Europe (New York: American Book Company, 1953), p. 72.
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gainful negotiations. King Carol, theRumanian Monarch-Dictator, openly
favored Hitler; His entire piplicy was summed up by the following statement:
. . . The immense (sic) of-Russia was always bearing upon 
her (Rumania) and she had to withstand it as best as she could,
Russia was, so to speak, the hereditary enemyt^®
29In the place of Titulescue, Victor Antonescu became the new Prime Minister. 
One of his chief aims was to improve relations with Poland which had deteriora­
ted because o f Titulescu's pro-Russian attitude. This resulted in an improve-
30
ment in the German Rumanian relations.
The ascendency of Antonescu resulted in some commercial advantages
for the Reich. At the close of 1936, Rumania signed contracts for German
armaments. The two countries also agreed upon the construction of an 800-
31million lei ($64 million) steelworks plant, subsidized by the Reich. Through­
out 1936, however, Rumania still remained financially independent of Germany
32
because Rumania's chief export product, o il, sold reaily on the world market.
In September of 1936, Germany and Rumania concluded an economic agreement 
concerning Germany's share o f Rumanian petroleum exports. The meeting
Cited in Roberts, Rumania, p. 190,
99Antonescu was, at the time of his appointment, the Minister of Finance. 
3 0 D .G er. F.P . "C", V o l. V , ,  p. 957.
31 Ibid.
3  ̂In 1937, petroleum production accounted for 40 per cent of Rumanian 
exports. In respect to its effect on the national economy, oil, including drill­
ing processing and transporting, made up 15 per cent of the total national budget 
receipts. See: S .E .E ., p. 128.
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exemplified the independence of Rumania. The negotiations ended with the
following agreement:
“With effect from October 1, 1936, German purchases 
of mineral oil and its derivatives . , . are only to be 
paid for under the provisions of the Clearing Agreement 
as long as the amounts paid in . . . each calendar 
quarter do not total mote than 25 per cent of dll amounts 
paid during the preceding calendar quarter . ,...33
The main advantage that Germany had over Rumania lay in her ability
34
to supply markets for Rumanian products that were difficult to sell elsewhere.
In 1937, Germany purchased 61.2  per cent of Rumania's corn exports, over 
5 ,7  per cent of her barley, 21 per cent of her rye and eight per cent of her
35
wheat. This gave Germany an opportunity to advance her economic exploi­
tation of Rumania. The Reich now began a slow infiltration into the Rumanian 
economy. A t the end of 1936, a large German industrial network, I .G .
Farben, built large soya bean and other fodder producing oleaginous plants in 
36
Rumania. The firms also concluded contracts with 70,000 -  100,000 
peasants. The contracts provided for the sale of the peasants' soya crops to 
German purchasers at a pre-determined price. The total acreage of soya bean
33S .E .E . ,  p. 135.
3^ P , G er. F.P.: " C ',  V o l. V . ,  p. 1004.
3^Roberts, p. 216.
3 6 Basch, p. 192.
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crops jumped from 1,465 h a .^  in 1936 -to ever 97,000 ha. in 1 9 3 7 .^ ' In
return, I .G .  Farben exported chemicals, dyes, and Factory equipment to 
Rumania from their German plants. As 1938 approached, as far as the Third 
Reich was concerned, Rumania remained the Balkan area's most economically 
independent nation.
39Schacht's fourth and final stop was in Sophia in mid-July. He met 
with much less resistance here than he had encountered in Rumania. O f all 
the Balkan States, Bulgaria represented the easiest target for ecqnomic exploit 
tat ion by Germany. As early as 1934, German joint stock companies had 
organized such companies as Hansa, Trakia, and Nova Maledonia in Bulgaria. 
These Bulgarian companies were run by offices inside G erm any.^ The sole 
purpose of these companies was to export Bulgarian agricultural and mining pro­
ducts to the Reich.
The political events within Bulgaria afforded great opportunities for
the extension of the Nazi economy within Bulgaria. A coup d'etat in November
41of 1935 within Bulgaria left Georgi Kiosseivqnov as the Premier, and Boris 
37ha. is an abbreviation for hectare (2.47 acres).
S^Basch, p . 1 9 ] ,
39°  When the term final stop is used, it concerns only the countriesdealt 
with in this thesis. Actually, Bulgaria was his second to the last stop as he pro­
ceeded to Ankara, Turkey.
Kosseu, H . Hristov and D. Angelov, A Short History of 
Bulgaria (Sophia--: Foreign Language Press, 1963), p . 361.
^  Long-time friend of King Boris, Chief of Court Chancellery .
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42now was in complete control of the Bulgarian government The success of 
Boris was a decided economic advantage for Germany.
The emergence of a monarchist-fascist government in Bulgaria caused 
a considerable change in its foreign policy. This in turn caused a pronounced
43
withdrawal of Western investments in Bulgaria (mainly French and Belgian).
Bulgaria's export products supplemented Germany's economy rather
than competing with it . Cereals, fruits, eggs, hides, and tobacco were the
44
main crops in Bulgarian agriculture. Bulgaria's climate was also suitable for
the cultivation of soya beans, a product that was needed by Germany. The
soya bean crop acreage increased from 2500 ha. in 1934 to 17,000 ha. in 
45
1937. From 1934 to 1937, Bulgaria's cotton production trebled while her
46
exports of finished goods to the Reich quadrupled.
Also a Revisionist State, Bulgaria's growing dependence upon Nazi
47
Germany did not bother her as it did some of the other Balkan countries. In
42 In the interlude between Georgiev and Kiosseivanov, the govern­
ment was run by the corrupt and inept administration of Andrei Toshev.
43 Stanley C . Evans, A Short History of Bulgaria (London: Lawrence 
andWisehart, Ltd., I960), p. 173.
44Kossev, Hristov, Angelos, p, 361.
^Basch, p. 187.
^ G re a t  Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, p. 192.
^Survey of International Affairs, 1936, p. 531.
June of 1936, Dr. Schacht talked of a Bulgarian economic isolation from the
48
rest of the Balkan nations. In November of 1937, 'Walter Funk informed
Prime Minister Kiossevianov of Germany's willingness to purchase as much as
Bulgaria wished to sell. The Reich also agreed to increase Bulgaria's import
quotas in raw materials, coffee, and tobacco for a period of up to twelve 
49
years.
50
In 1933, one-third of Bulgaria's exports went to Germany. By
mid-1936, the corresponding figure approximated 63 per cent, while Bulgarian
imports from the Reich reached a level of about 54 per cent of her total imports.
Germany purchased 40 per cent of Bulgaria's greatest agricultural crop,
51tobacco, by 1936.
Dr. Schacht's tour of the four Balkan States succeeded in accomplish­
ing two profitable advantages for Germany: favorable economic negotiations 
for Germany with each nation, and an increase in the dependency of the Balkan 
countries upon Germany.
Undoubtedly, the restrictive measures undertaken by the League of 
Nations made the Reich's economic endeavors infinitely simpler. The action
^Evans, p. 173.
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prompted immediate negotiations with Yugoslavia, heretofore an accepted 
Italian sphere of interest.
"World events were soon to greater facilitate Germany's economic 
drive into Southeastern Europe. Developments elsewhere in Europe, such as 
the Anschluss and the aftermath of Munich, figured decisively in the immedi­
ate future of the Balkan States.
CHAPTER IV
THE EFFECT OF THE ANSCHLUSS AND THE OCCUPATION OF 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA O N  THE BALKAN STATES
; In 1938, the Balkan States as well as the rest of the world witnessed
an abrupt change in the demeanor of the Third Reich. Outright annexation
appeared to be Germany's newly adapted modus operandi. The German army
crossed the Austrian border, under Hitler's orders, on March 12, 1938. The 
2
Anschluss, in addition to giving the Nazis economic gains, also gave the 
Germans a valuable advantage by improving both their geographical and politi­
cal position vis a vis the Balkan countries. The Anschluss showed, too, a lack 
of either initiative or desire by the Western Powers to intervene in the affairs of 
Southeastern Europe. The Great Powers adopted a wait-and-see attitude upon 
hearing the news of the Anschluss. On March 12, Ambassador Dieckhoff wrote 
to Berlin that M r . -Hull:
. . . was obviously thoroughly impressed by the (Anschluss) 
proclamation. He thanked me for the information. From
 ̂Wilhelm Keitel, (Ed. by Walter Gorlitz), The Memoirs of Field 
Marshall Keitel (New York; Stein and Day, 1966), p. 59.
2 A loose translation of Anschluss is the word Union: This was forbidden
by the Treaty of St. Germain. It was designed in 1938 to stop Dr. Schuschnigg
from holding a plebescite to determine Austria's direction
51
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the few questions that he asked, it was apparent that 
he thoroughly understands our action.^
4 5In Rome, Lord Perth concurred with Ciano's statement about the
Anschluss. 'There is nothing to do . . . we cannot force the people to be
6
independent if  they do not wish to be so." Mussolini was on a skiing vaca­
tion when he heard the news, and proclaimed that the acquisition of Austria by 
Germany was inevitable.7
The European countries in the-Southeast received the news of the
Anschluss with mixed emotions. On March 11, the day before the Nazi coup,
8Stoyadinovitch discussed the situation with Arthur Bliss Lane. jn his conver­
sation with Lane, Stoyadinovitch spoke harshly against France and Great
.9
Britain's hesitancy to be involved in the whole affair. As far as retaliation
O
John A . Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe (New York: 
The American Book Company, 1958), p. 121, A Iso sees : D .G er. F. P, ,  " D", 
Vol . 1 . ,  p. 616.
^ Lord Earl o f  Perth, Sir Eric Drummond, British Ambassador to Italy, 
formerly Secretary General to the League o f Nations.
^Italian Foreign Minister,
-  D . Brit. F.P. , Third Series, Vol. I . ,  p. 28.
7 S .E .E ., p. 47.
® U n ite d S ta tes Ambassado r to Yugo si a v ia .
9 Stoyadinovitch believed that if  M r, Eden had accepted the Italian 
position in Ethiopia, and thereby gained Italy as an ally , Germany would not 
dare; to move against Austria . See: Schacher, Germany Pushes Southeast, 
p. 214. ' ‘ ^
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by Yugoslavia was concerned, he stated that; "There will be no troop move-
. '  . . 10ments in Yugoslavia . . . Yugoslavia remains with her arms folded." The
Stoyadinovitch government, however, did more than remain in a neutral posi­
tion. The instructions issued to the border guards commanded them to cooperate 
with the German troops that were now being stationed across the line. A request
sent to Berlin asked the Reich to guarantee the security of the frontier of 
11
Yugoslavia . Hitler responded with the announcement that Germany had no
aims beyond Austria, and made the statement that: "We (Germany) are lucky
in having here such frontiers that we were relieved of the trouble of defending 
12
them m ilitarily." On March 14, Stoyadinovitch publicly declared that
13
Yugoslavia was not concerned with Austrian events.
The general staff in Yugoslavia now began to consider its precarious 
position. Germany needed Yugoslav compliance if it was to succeed in its 
efforts toward domination of Southeastern. Europe. The position of the Reich 
army on that country's northern border made it possible for Germany to increase 
her military and economic pressure on Yugoslavia. Another factor that 
Yugoslavia had to consider was the appeasement policy of Great Britain and 
France. ^
10F.R. of U .S ., 1938, V o l. . I . ,  p. 431.
n D .G e r ,F .P . ,  "D", V o l. V . ,  p . 184.
12 I .M .T ., (Doc. 2719,-PS).
^Lukacs, p. 120,
^Schacher, p. 218.
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The Anschluss also was interpreted as an ominous warning by the remain­
ing Balkan States. The presence of Germany, which now occupied the strategic
position in the Danube Valley, sent the Balkan countries into a flurry of diploma- 
15tic discussions. 'With the possession of Austria/ Nazi Germany now had
military and economic control as well as ready access to Southeastern Europe by
road, river transportation, and railw ays.^ The Balkan governments now sought
the friendship of Bulgaria, and that of Hungary, if it could be achieved.
A Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed between Bulgaria
and members of the Little Entente on July 31, 1938. Under the terms of the
18
treaty, the arms limitation imposed by the Treaty of Neuilly was abrogated. 
From this point on, however, the talks became distinctly reminiscent of the 
abortive Balkan Conferences. Bulgaria refused to discard its territorial griev­
ances. The extent of the Bulgar concessions was an agreement towards settle­
ment of disputes through arbitration. No decisions were reached concerning
19
the settlement of the revisionist questions. The Bulgarian Government refused 
to enter the Balkan Entente without specific guarantees concerning the revision 
of her fro n tie r.^
15S „E .E .,.p , 47.
16 Ibid..
^  Hoptner,
1 Q
•See Chapter I , ,  p?
19S.E .E ., p. 48, fn. 1.
20 D. Ger. F»P. ,  " D V V o l.  V I . ,  No. 167, p. 327.
Bulgaria went a step further against her sister States than she had in
the early Thirties. -She solicited the aid of the Reich. The Bulgarian Foreign
Minister gave orders to his Minister in Berlin that he was to offer Germany his
country’s economic and political cooperation in return for recognition of
21
Bulgarian territorial demands. Once again, revisionist disputes thwarted ah
attempt towards Balkan unity.
• Germany's annexation of Austria aided the Reich economically. The
reserves of gold and foreign assets in the Austrian National Bank amounted to
approximately RM. 248 million. This was in addition to an unknown amount of
private holdings of foreign assets. These funds were of great importance to the
German Government. The Reich's total balance of gold and foreign exchange
22
in the Reich Bank had dwindled to a mere RM. 77 million ($30.5 million).
The Austrian surplus of dairy products also helped to relieve Germany's shortage
23
of these products and, in fact, increased the Reich's supply by 19 per cent.
The incorporation of Austria by Germany resulted in a 54 per cent increase in
24
Germany's timber supply. Up to this time, Germany had suffered from a 
shortage of manpower because of the increase in the size of the German Army. 
The Anschluss rectified this situation as well. The number of unemployed
21 Ibid
22League, W .E .S ., 1938/1939, p. 217.
2 3 League, W .E .S ., 1937/1938, p .-184,
2 4 League, W .E .S ., 1938/1939, p. 218.
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persons in Austria Fell from 351,000 in May of 1938 to a total of 59,000 in May
of 1939. The reason for this great decrease in unemployment was the Austrian
25workers' access to immediate employment in German factories.
The annexation of Austria resulted in a great decrease in the German
debt in the Balkan countries. Austria, unlike the Reich, had extensive credits 
26in the Balkans. Germany's total indetedness to the Balkans declined from
RM. 567 million ($140 million) in March of 1935 to RM. 250 million ($62
27million) in March of 1938. In addition to this, Austria also had investments
in banks in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Rumania. The value of these invest-
28
ments was approximately RM. 65 million ($12 million).
On September 29, 1938, the Four Powers, France, Great Britain,
Italy and Germany, agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia at Munich. 
Czechoslovakia was not invited to the conference nor was she consulted on the 
decisions that were made there . The only part that Czechoslovakia played as
2  ̂Ibid.
^Basch, p. 205.
2^ Survey of International Affairs, 1938, Vol. 11 .,  p. 48.
28 It must be pointed out that the relationship between banking and 
industry was far more direct in this part of the world as compared to the United 
States. Hence, control of a bank's securities meant much more than a country 
owning investments in American banks. European banks of the period were much 
more independent of their respective governments than were their American 
counterparts.
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a result of this conference was her acceptance of her surrender at 2:15 a.m . on
September 30. “When the draft was presented to the Foreign Minister of
Czechoslovakia, Kamil Krofta, he accepted it and made the following statement:
"The president and the government submit to the conditions of the Munich Agree-
29
ment which has come into being without Czechoslovakia and against her."
Less thpn six months later, on the night of March 14 and 15, 1939, German 
troops occupied Prague.
The occupation of Czechoslovakia was highly profitable for the Reich 
in terms of economics. At the end of 1938, the reserves of gold and foreign 
assets In the National Bank of Czechoslovakia approximated RM. 275 million. 
These funds did not include the private holdings and government securities that 
were being held in foreign banks. In addition to this, Czechoslovakia held
31a TO million ($49.6 million) credit against Great Britain. Because of the 
Munich Conference, Czechoslovakia also became a powerless, lifeless satellite 
of the Reich.
As a result of Germany's activity in Zaechoslovakia, the Balkan coun-
32tries were reluctant to do anything which might turn the Reich against them.
29 The Economist, May 14, 1938, p. 355.
30
' ,Radamir Luza, The Transfer of the Sudetan -  Germans; A Study of 
Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962 (New York: New York University Press,
1964), p. 150. 1
31 League, W .E ;S ., 1938/1939, p. 217.
32 Ibid.
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This hesitancy had a great deal to do with the economic situation now facing
Southeastern Europe. Nearly a third of the Balkan countries' export trade had
33been with Austria and Czechoslovakia before their annexation.
Czechoslovakia also had a large credit balance in various countries
34
which totaled kc. 2.38 billion ($595,000,000) At least kc . 500 million
($125 million) of that amount were balances in the countries of Southeastern
35
Europe. These balances immediately fell under the control of Germany.
In addition, Czechoslovakia had a great many investments in Southeastern
Europe, such as the textile industries of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary;
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria's sugar industry; the Hungarian and Yugoslav glass
industry; and investments in the Banks of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
Czechoslovakia's private and governmental capital in Yugoslavia approximated
nearly 775 million dinars ($385 million), or about 18 per cent of the total foreign
36
investments in Yugoslavia. The Reich also gained control of about 14 per
37
cent of the foreign capital in Bulgaria.
33Basch, p. 206.
34lbid.
35lb id ., p. 209.
tively <
36Great Britain and France followed with 14 and 17 per cent, respec-
3 ^Basch, p. 208.
59
Following occupation of Prague, Germany continued to increase her
trade with the Balkans. The Reich continued to pay higher prices for Balkan
38
produce than the Balkan countries could obtain on the free world market. 
Germany's economic situation was also helped by her territorial gainsT Bulgaria, 
which was now completely dependent upon Germany, proved to be no obstacle
39
in Germany's aim f° r control of Southeastern Europe.
40
Shortly after attending the conference at Munich, Dr. Funk went to
several of the Balkan capitals as Dr. Schacht had done in June of 1936, His
first visit was to Belgrade. His first proposal stated that Germany was willing
to buy one-half of Yugoslavia's goods in exchange for a Yugoslav promise to
41
purchase a predetermined amount of German goods. Yugoslavia momentarily
resisted this offer, but weakened when the Reich offered to buy 125,000 tons of
Yugoslavian w heat a t  155 dinars ($72) per ton as compared to Great Britain's
42
price of 53 dinars ($27.50) per ton.
Rumania, always conscious of Hungary's revisionist aims concerning 
Transylvania, sought the favor of the Reich. For this reason, the Rumanian
38League, W .E ,S ., 1938/1939, p. 204,
^-Schacher, p. 274,
Dr. Walter Funk was Schacht's successor as Minister Of Economics in 
November, 1937 and was President of the Reichbank in January of 1939. Funk 
was later convicted at Nuremberg and sentenced to life imprisonment,
^The Economist, November 5, 1938, p. 263.
^Survey of International Affairs, 1938, V o l I I . ,  p. 61,
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Government hesitated to do anything that Germany might interpret as against 
its own interests.4  ̂ The German interest in Rumania centered on its need for 
o il .
Owing to Rumania's precarious position, the negotiations were
quickly completed. In December, 1938, Germany and Rumania signed an
agreement which provided for a 50 per cent increase in the oil trade between
44
the two countries for the following year. The proviso also stipulated that
the value of the commodities traded would be equal, preventing Germany
45
from increasing its debit balance in Rumania. Germany also agreed to 
increase her petroleum purchases frpm Rumania by 20 to 25 per cent over 
1938.46
The commercial policy of Great Britain and France was an important 
reason for Germany's steady increase in trade with the countries in South­
eastern Europe. In the fall of 1938, delegations from Rumania and Bulgaria
had gone to London in an attempt to seek aid from Great Britain to rescue
47
their countries from strangulation by the German trading practices. Prime 
Minister Chamberlain summed up Great Britain's policy towards Southeastern
43S .E .E ./ p. 52.
44
Basch, p. 211.
45
Survey of International Affairs, 1938, Vol. V I I . ,  p. 56.
Basch, p. 211.
4 ^Schacher, p. 231.
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Europe in a speech to the House of Commons at the beginning of Novembers
Great Britain was not attempting to prevent Germany's 
commercial expansion in this (sic) part of the world.
Geographically, Germany must occupy a dominating 
position there . . . so far as this country is concerned, 
we have no wish to block Germany out from those 
countries or encircle her economically,
Britain's trade problem with the Danubian and Balkan States was one of
quantity. The Balkan countries were able only to export annually 7 million
49(approximately $35 million) in goods to Great Britain whereas 48 million 
50
($240 million) were needed for the Balkan exports to be of any value in
Britain's economy. It was not feasible for Great Britain to increase Balkan
purchases for several reasons. Such a policy would have upset a long established
51
trade balance with her regular customers.
Another obstacle was-Great Britain's hesitancy to buy goods in bulk 
52
quantities as Germany did. Great Britain did agree, however, to buy
53400,000 tons of wheat from Rumania in September, 1938. The following month,
Great Britain purchased 200,000 tons of wheat for storage. This fact illustrates
48 House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates, November 1, 1938,
pp. 67-68.
49Austria and Czechoslovakia are excluded since by this time they were 
under German control.
^^The Economist, November 5, 1938, p. 266.
51 Ibid., p .-267.
^ Basch, p. 2 1 2 .
5 3  Ibid.
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the inability of Great Britain to provide a permanent market for Balkan pur­
chases. Sporadic purchasing could provide no alternative to the need for 
fixed markets on the part of the Balkan countries, regardless of the size of the 
transaction. The Balkan countries needed a steady and permanent customer,
a customer who would buy regularly and who would provide competition for
54
Germany's purchases. Also, the trade policy of Great Britain differed from 
Germany. While Germany bought as a single purchasing unit, the private 
enterprise system enjoyed in Great Britain prevented the government from 
interference in trade direction (except in cases of stock-pile purchases). A 
fourth and decisive factor was the price. The Balkans were still unable to pro­
duce as cheaply as the western countries.
Except for her purchase of oil from Rumania and her purchases of ore 
from Yugoslavia, France was at no time a large customer of the Balkan countries.
In 1937, the French imports from the Balkans never exceeded four per cent of
55
the total export trade of the two countries. France imported grains only when
her own yields were inadequate.
In 1938, Germany no .longer faced the problem of gaining ascendency
in the Balkans. That was already accomplished. Now the problem became
56
how the Balkan area could best fulfill the demands of Germany. The
^Schacher, p. 252,
^ Survey of International Affairs, 1938, Vol. I I . ,  p. 66. 
^Basch, p. 216.
Anschluss and occupation of Prague revealed the Reich's change in modus
operand)’ . Germany began to  sw itch from economic penetration in the Balkans
and initiated outright territorial annexation of states neighboring the Balkan
countries. The chief purpose of the economic involvement of Germany in the
Balkans had been to form a German hinterland. By doing this, Germany could
then make herself as self-sufficient as possible anchro longer be dependent upon
the rest of the world. At a Nuremberg Party Rally in 1938, Goring stated that
the most important part of the Four Year Plan was to ensure that the German
people would always have food, even if Germany were completely surrounded
5 7
by enemies and engaged in a war which would last for thirty years.
The occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia now placed Germany in 
the position of being able to dictate commercial agreements rather than merely 
negotiate them. By reflecting upon the role of the Western Powers concerning 
Austria and Czechoslovakia, the Balkan countries could clearly see the political 
risks involved if they refrained from acquiescing to Nazi demands.
By the end of 1938, the Reich, having gained predominance over 
Central and Southeastern Europe, was able to secure a steady and reliable supply 
of agricultural products. The percentages of the world total of agricultural pror- 
ducts available to the Reich are listed in the table on the following page:
^ S u rv e y  of International A ffa irs , 1938, V o l , I I , ,  p . 3 .
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Table 6
Agricultural Production in Central and Southeastern Europe
t
(In Percentage of World Production)
Country Wheat Corn Oats Barley Rye Sugar
beets
Tobacco Wool Flax Hemp
Austria 0 .3 0.2 0.6 0,7 1.2 1 .8 0.1 1.2
Czechoslo­
vakia 1.1 0 .3 1.9 3.0 3.5 4.7 0 .6 0.1 0 .4 3.1
Hu ngary 1.6 2 .4 0.5 1.7 1.6 1.3 0 .8 0 .4 0 .4 12.2
Yugoslavia 1.8 4 .5 0.5 1.0 0 .5 0.8 0 .9 0 .8 1.4 6 .6
Rumania 2 .9 4 .0 0.7 1.9 1.1 1.4 0 .4 1.7 1.1 1,1
Bulgaria 1.3 0.7 0.1 0 .8 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.1
Greece 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.1 2 .8 0.5
Germany 3.3 0.1 9 .3 9.7 17.8 17.9 1.4 1.1 4 .2 1.7
Total 12.9 12.5 13.8 19.4 26.1 28.1 7 .6 5.1 8 .7 25.9
By April, 1939, economic policy and foreign policy in Southeastern 
Europe blended to form one and the same program. The immediate result of this 
program was the emergence of Danubia and the Balkans as German dependencies. 
There was no Great Power in Western Europe that was willing to assist the smaller 
and weaker countries in Southeastern Europe in their fight against the totalitarian 
aggression by Germany.
Basch, p. 230.
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The smaller countries, although they did try to establish commercial 
intercourse with the rest of the world, had little alternative but to turn to 
Germany. Once trade with the totalitarian Reich occupied a large proportion
i
of their commerce, there was no possibility of maintaining free trade elsewhere.
59 Ib id., p . .225.
CHAPTER V
THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE BALKANS
If the year 1938 proved to the Balkans (as well as to the rest of the 
world) to be an ominous warning as to Germany's future activities, the early 
events of 1939 did nothing to ease those apprehensions. Mid-March saw the 
Reich swallow the remainder of Czechoslovakia.^ Germany's sweeping dip­
lomatic successes at Munich and its culmination in the occupation of Prague 
awakened the Balkans to the folly in their hope that the Western Democracies 
were likely to put a stop to Nazi aggression in Central and Southeastern Europe. 
In view of French and British reluctance to honor their guarantees while follow­
ing a policy, of appeasement, the Balkan States held little faith in the value of 
the Western European countries as guarantors of their own sovereignty. It was
with this air of misgivings that Greece and Rumania received British and French
2guarantees on April 13, 1939.
James E. MeSherry, Stalin, Hitler and Europe, The Origin of 
World War II (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1968), p. 121.
2 Stavrianos., p. 746. Given to Rumania and Greece by Great 
Britain and France, it was a unilateral guarantee of independence. It was 
also a move of retal iation to Mussolini's move into Albania one week earlier.
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The most significant diplomatic development of the year, one that
would directly concern not only Southeastern Europe but the rest of the world
as well, occurred on August 23, 1939. Nazi Germany entered into a non-
3
aggression treaty with the Soviet Union. That Hitler's diplomatic coup cast
a foreboding cloud on the safety of the Balkan States was hinted at by the
Fuehrer's address to his military leaders as Ribbentrop was about to sign the
pact with Stalin:
"I have decided to go with Stalin . . . .  . Stalin and I 
are the only ones who see only the future. So I shall 
shake hands with Stalin in a few weeks on the common 
German ̂ Russian border and undertake with him a new 
distribution of the world.
The Nazi-Soviet interpretation of "new distribution" was not long
concealed from the rest of the world as the morbid drama of 1939 revealed itself.
On September 1, 1939, the German Army crossed the Polish border to settle all
disputes between the two countries. Within a month, Poland disappeared from 
5
the: map of Europe.
 ̂Nazi: Soviet Relations, 1939-41, pp. 72-75.
^ Lukacs, p. 245 . By terms of a secret protocol, signed jointly with 
the published pact, the Reich agreed to remain uninvolved while Russia repos­
sessed the Rumanian province of Bessarabia. For an account of the secret pro­
tocol, see also: Stavrianos, The Balkans, p. 747.
**The length of time quoted here is subject to debate . While the 
offensive's success was apparent within a week's time, the government fled into 
Rumania on the 18th and the Warsaw Garrison surrendered on the 28th. Stronger 
contingents of the army held out until October 5. For an excel lent account of 
the Polish campaign see: B.H . Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War 
(New York: G .P . Putnams Sons, 1970), p. 31.
6 8
Great Britain and France, even in breaking with their policy of 
appeasement with their declaration o f war on ■Germany, were unable to prevent 
Poland's dismemberment. The world sat back, watched Poland overrun, and 
braced itself for whatever the uncertain future would bring. However, the 
following five months produced little activity as Germany and the two Western 
European powers were locked in a "phony w ar.11̂
On April 8, 1940, the five-month deceptive lull ended with the Nazi
assault on Norway 1  The Fuehrer, not waiting until the official capitulation of
8 . 9
Norway, began his sweep through the Low Countries and France on May 10.
On May 15, the Dutch Army surrendered; the night of the 27th and 28th saw
With the situation in Poland under control, the Fuehrer had ordered 
an immediate attack begun on the Netherlands, Belgium and France to begin 
on November 12. However, the German generals convinced Hitler to postpone 
the attack. For an account of Hitler's successive postponements, see:
Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 643-652.
^ The purpose of the violation of the Norwegian neutrality was the 
vital necessity for the Reich to maintain a winter route (along the Norwegian 
coast) open for transportation o f Swedish iron ore. See: Eugene Anderson, 
Modern Europe in World Perspective, 1914 to the Present (New York: Holt 
Rinehart and Winston, 1958), p. 530.
g
Allied forces were evacuated from Narvik on June 7, 1941. On 
that same date, the King and his government left for Great Britain. For an 
excellent account of the battle for control of Norway, see: : Hart, The Second 
World War, pp. 51-63.
9 Winston S . Churchill, The Second World War: The Gathering 
Storm, V o !. I (Boston: The Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), pf 662.
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10 11 the Belgians capitulate. By June 4, British forces had fled the continent.
The most shocking events were happening in France, however. The world
reacted with disbelief at the ease with which the "mightiest nation on the
European continent," France, disintegrated before the German onslaught. On
June 10, the French Government left Paris, and on June 14, that city was occu-
12pied by the German Eighteenth Army. Indeed, at m id-1940, Europe was at 
the mercy of Adolf Hitler. The general feeling was that Hitler had won the 
war.
As the war progressed, even during the early stages, the importance
of Southeastern Europe to the Reich took on even greater dimensions. As early
as 1935, Nazi officials had realized the Balkan nations would be their best
source of supplies. They also realized that the Balkan nations would be the
13easiest for Germany to defend in case of war.
^Anderson, p. 531.
11 Ibid.
12Shirer, p. 738.
13
Burton H . Klein, Germany's Economic Preparation for War 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 59. The German drive into 
Poland was complemented by the drive of the Russians into the Baltic. The 
activity in the area removed all possibility of establishing a northern front by 
the Allies against Germany. The end of the Finnish War closed the northern 
part of Europe to Allied access.
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Allied military preparations at the eastern end of the Mediterranean 
caused considerable concern among members of the Nazi High Command. In 
February, 1940, the British and French troops in the eastern Mediterranean 
numbered over 500,000. In view of this fact, British and French officials con­
sidered three alternatives that would be open to H itler.
1 . Hitler could attack in the West.
2 . . Hitler might go southeast into the Balkans.
3 . Hitler might go east against Russia in order to obtain
14
"Lebensraum, V food and o i l .
It Was real ized early that if one or more of the Balkan Nations, par­
ticularly Greece, could form an alliance with Turkey, a southeastern front
15
might be opened up against Germany. The focal objective of Germany's
Balkan interest was Rumania. Rumania's chief product, o il, was of vital impor-
16
tance to Germany's war production . O f all the Balkan countries, Rumania 
most successfully had maintained her self-determination against the German 
economic onslaught. As a result of this, Rumania was able to continue the
^ S ir  Edmund Ironside, The Ironside Diaries, 1937-1940 (London: 
Constuble and Company, Ltd., 1962), p. 111.
15
Sir 'Winston Churchill, The Grand AI liance (Boston: Houghton, 
M ifflin  Company, 1950), p. .4.
Edgar Me Innis, The War, V o ). I (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1945., p. 172.
71
17
sale of her valuable products fo the western countries. The competition for
Rumanian oil intensified. In December of 1939, Germany and Rumania signed
an agreement in which Rumania promised to deliver 130,000 tons of oil per 
18
month to the Reich. Of this amount, however, only 26,000 tons of oil
actually was received by Germany because 80 per cent of Rumania's oil industry
1 9 *was owned by Great Britain and France. Early in the war, the Allies rea-
20
lized the importance of curtailing Germany's supply of Rumanian o i l . Owing
to this, early competition between the Reich and the "West raised the price of
21
Rumanian oil from $17 to $44 per ton.
The early success of the German Army in Europe gave the Reich an 
overwhelming advantage in her dealings with the Balkan States. The N a z i-  
Soviet Pact, together with the ease with which the German onslaught had'over­
run five successive European countries, left no doubt on the part of the Balkans 
as to the dangers of alienating the Fuehrer. With France's col lapse and the 
British evacuation of the continent, Rumania was more affected than the rest of 
the Balkan States. Its guarantee by the West was useless.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ib id ., p. 207.
Winston Spencer Ghurchill, Memoirs o f the Second World War 
(Boston: Houghton-Miff I in Co. ,  1959), p. 206.
2lM clnnis, V o l. I . ,p .  119.
For the Balkans, (again particularly Rumania), another problem doubly 
jeopardized their position— the presence of the Soviet Union on their border.
The Nazi successes were doing nothing to sate Stalin’s appetite to share in the 
spoils. Rumania, only too mindful of Russia's Bessarabian aims, especially saw 
the gravity of the situation. As was dreaded, France's collapse did not long
precede Soviet movements to entrench themselves in Southeastern Europe.
22 23 
On June 23, 1940, Molotov told Schulenberg th a t" . . .
Rumania had done nothing to bring about-a solution of the Bessarabian problem.
Therefore, something would have to be done . . . .  The Soviet government was
still striving for a peaceful solution, but it was determined to use force, should
24
the Rumanian government decline a peaceful agreement."
Three days later, on June 26, 1940, the Soviet Government issued an
ultimatum to Rumania, demanding not only Bessarabia but parts of Bukovina within
25 26
twenty-four hours. Germany advised Rumania to accept the Russian demands.
22Vyacheslav M . Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs from 1939-
1949.
23
Friedrich "Werner (Count von der), German Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, 1934-1941.
24
Nazi Soviet Relations, p. 155.
oc
Winston S. Churchil I, The Second World Wars Their Finest Hour 
(Vol. II) (Boston; Houghton M ifflin Company, 1949), p. 137.
26
Nicholas Horthy, Memoirs. (New York; Robert Speller and Sons, 
1957), p. 179. Also see; Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 137.
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A diplomatic flurry followed the Fuehrer's advice and Hitler could scarcely
contain both Hungary and Bulgaria from promptly invading the remainder of 
27Rumania.
The Hungarians prepared themselves for armed aggression to regain
28
their loss of 1919, On July 10, 1940, Hitler and Ciano received Teleki 
29
and Casky and gave them freedom of action in regard to the Rumanian quest- 
tion, but Hitler warned the Hungarians that they would receive no aid from
30
either Germany or Italy in any action they might take. Hitler, seeing the
opportunity presented to him, offered to send King Carol a demarche asking him
to acqept negotiations. Carol responded by offering Hitler an alliance between 
. 31
Germany and Rumania. It was at this point that it became clear that the 
whole Transylvanian question was nothing but a bait held out by Germany, 
taking advantage of their advantageous position, to entice both Rumania and
27
Russia encouraged the revisionist aims of Hungary in Transylvania
28 . •
Count Pal Teleki,, Hungarian Prime Minister, February, 1939 to
April, 1941.
29 Count Istvan, Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1938 to 1941.
^H u gh  Gibson, (ed.), The Ciano Diaries, 1939-43. (New York: 
Doubleday and Co •, nc ., 1946), (July 10, 1940), p. 274.
Ol
Malcomb Muggeridge, (ed.), Ciano's Diplomatic Papers (London: 
Odhams Press, Limited, 1948), p. 381
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32
Hungary to seek halp from Germany. Regardless of the outcome, Germany
would emerge as th& ultimate winner. On July 15, 1940, the Fuehrer rejected
Carol's plea for an alliance, telegraphing Carol that Rumania must come to
terms with Hungary. He also told the King that Germany was not going to
interfere in any Hungarian plans concerning Rumania. Hitler also stated that
Germany was not interested in helping Rumania, even if it meant that Germany
33
would have to dispense with Rumanian o i l . The Fuehrer's scheme succeeded.
34 , . 35
- Carol submitted to Germany 's demands and sent Manoilescu and Gigurtu to
H itler. Hitler's decision would guide Rumania as to what course of action she
, , 36 should take.
The Fuehrer next moved to settle Bulgaria's disputes with its neighbors, 
particularly Rumania. He approved of Bulgaria's land claims and stated that he 
believed that the three Balkan States should come to terms. Germany would
37 TL
act as the mediator between the newly formed bloc of States. The discussions 
took place in two separate locations: The Rumanians met with Ciano and 
Mussolini in Rome, while Hitler met with the Bplgarian leaders at Salzburg.
3^Horthy, p. 325,
33 Survey of International Affairs, Triumph of the Axis, p. 325.
34 Mihai Manoilescu, Gufenu's successor as Prime Minister a decided
Germanophile
35
Don Gigurtu, Rumanian Prime Minister,
36
Survey of International Affairs, Triumph > p. 325.
37 Ibid.
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38The outcome of the negotiations was the-Second Vienna Award, signed on
August 30, 1940. Under the terms of this treaty, Northern Transylvania was
39
attached to Hungary. Hungary now received an areg of 16,642 square
miles with a population of 2, 393,600. Southern Dpbrubia, which had an area
of some 3,000 square miles, was taken by Bulgaria. The total amount of land
which Rumania lost was about 20,000 square miles with a population of about 
4 0  *4,000 ,000 . According to Ciano: "The Hungarians couldn't contain their
joy when they saw the map. Then we heard a loud thud. It was Manoilescu*
41
who fainted on the table ."
In return for Germany's guaranty of the award, Hungary agreed to
42
step up the delivery of foodstuffs to Germany. The Reich gained a great 
deal from the Vienna Award. For one thing, it succeeded in preventing a 
Balkan "War . In addition, due to the manner in which Transylvania was parti­
tioned, Germany succeeded in transferring the major railway line into the more
43
compliant Hungarian hands. This railway line wqs vital to Germany as it 
enabled her to gain a direct route to the Rumanian oil fields. Lastly, the
3^AIso known as the Second Belvedere Award.
Szinai and L, Szuce, The Confidential Papers of Admiral 
Horthy (Budapest: Corvina Press, 1965), p. 132.
^ T h is  came to be known as the Treaty of Craiova.
44 Gibson, (Ciano), December 6, 1940, p. 319.
42 M . Szinai and L. Szuce, (Horthy), p. 132.
4 3 Survey of International Affairs, Triumph, p. 325,
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Reich had succeeded in satisfying the greater part of Bulgaria's revisionist aims.
By the award, Germany gained everything useful while making Hungary play
the role of the wolf. -Thus  ̂ Germany, in one stroke, gained a hold in all three
44
capitals, Budapest, Bucharest and Sophia. The situation between the Award 
countries relaxed somewhat, as Hungary was resting on the laurels of new acqui­
sitions, and Rumania was torn apart internally.
The loss of Transylvania drove King Carol from the throne in favor of 
his son, M ichael. The real power behind the throne was General Antonescu,
45the newly appointed Prime Minister. As soon as Antonescu took office, he
publicly proclaimed his intention of using his power to complete the transforma-
46
tion of Rumania into a fascist state to be firmly attached to Germany and Italy.
The new Premier wasted no time in following through with his intentions.
Antonescu immediately announced that, henceforth, the pro-totalitarian group,
the Iron Guard, would be the only legal political group or party permitted in 
47
Rumania. In September of 1940, Nazi SS officials began their infiltration 
into Rumania under the pretense of assisting in the relocation of Germans leaving 
Bessarabia (in case of a Soviet invasion). In October, German troops openly
44 Ibid., p .  328,
4^ In July of 1940, King Carol had him arrested twice, but appointed 
him Premier in the wake of political insurrection,
46|
Lukacs, p. 313.
’Mclnnis, V o l. I . ,  p. 262,
47
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occupied Rumania, particularly around the oil fields of Ploesti.
On October 9, von Ribbentrop sent off a message to Moscow to calm
the anxiety there regarding German troop movements in Rumania:
. . . The Rumanian government some time ago made 
a request of us to make available to it, for the training 
of the Rumanian army, a military mission with certain 
instruction units from the German a rm y .^
The purpose of the movement was the necessity of protecting those 
50
interests from Great Britain. General Antonescu asked the German Ministry
in Rumania for
. . . aerial defense of Ploesti (anti-aircraft artillery 
and pursuit planes) . . . .  The General bases his 
request on . . . the dangers to the oil fields which 
would be increasingly great as soon as the arrival of 
the advance party (instructional units) became known 
to England.^
By June of 1940, German penetrqtion into Southeastern Europe with­
out outright military take-over reached its limits. From this point on, qny 
German gains would come about only through military occupation.
The successes of the German Army in Western Europe, the Norwegian 
Campaign, and the troop movements in the Balkan countries during the first year
^Survey of International Affairs, Triumph, p. 330,
Nazi-Soviet Relations, p, 20$,
50 Ibid,
51 D .Q e r.F .P ., "D", Vol. X . ,  N o . 151, p. 260.
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of the war, served to whet Mussolini's appetite for a shqre of the limelight,
Italy's success in Albania did little to satisfy Mussolini's expansionist aims.
The Duce had entered the war on June 10, 1940, but the declaration was too
52late for him to claim any responsibility for the capitulation of France, The 
situation facing Mussolini worsened, as he persistently heard rumors of peace
53
overtures made to Great Britain by Germany.
On June 19, 1940, Hitler and Ribbentrop met with their Italian
counterparts at Munich to discuss armistice terms to be imposed on France,
Mussolini's fears of "being caught in the outbreak of peace" was increased by
Ribbentrop's statement that peace feelers were operating through Swedish chan- 
54nels. Mussolini was fearful of the possibility of an early peace between
Great Britain and Germany, because of intentions concerning France. As
early as July, the German Ministers in the countries of Western Europe were
sending dispatches to Berlin concerning the British attitude on the continuation
55
of the war. On July 22, 1940 Ambassador HempeI wrote:
"Prospects for the continuation of the wqr are generally 
regarded with pessimism. While the middle and lower 
classes of people are depressed and longing for a speedy 
peace, the ruling class is still preponderate!y in favor 
of going pn with the war." ^6
^  Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rpme-Berlin Axis, A History of the 
Relations Between Hitler and Mussolini (New York: Oxford University Press,
1949), p. 215
^Lukacs, p. 316.
^Wiskemann, p. 216.
Edward Hempel, German Ambassador to Iceland, 1937-1945.
5 6 D .G er, F .P ., "D", Vo l. X . ,  p. 262.
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If such a peace were achieved, Italy's North African claims against France
might be ignored. Mussolini began to speak of action against either Greece
57or Yugoslavia as early as September.
"When German troops began occupying Rumania in defense of the
Ploesti oil fields during the summer of 1940, the Duce was surprised and
angered. It was at this point that Mussolini decided that Greece was to be
his next sphere of activ ity , On October 12, he told Ciano:
"Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli. This 
time I am going to pay him back in his own coin.
He will find out from the papers that I have occupied 
Greece. In this way, the equilibrium will be 
re-established. "5®
The Fuehrer and his Foreign Minister were leaving France on October 27,
591940 when they received word of the Italian plans concerning Greece to take 
place the following day. .Hitler immediately ordered Ribbentrop to arrange a 
meeting between Mussolini and himself the following day. ^  It was too late. 
As German officials emerged from the train the next day, Mussolini gleefqlly 
addressed Hitler: "Fuehrer, we are on the march! Victorious ltdlian troops
^Wiskemann, p. 226.
Gibson, October 12, 1940, p. 300.
59 The two were returning from Montoire, where Petain had signed an 
agreement collaborating with Germany towards Great Britain's fa ll. The meet­
ing was the second stop in the journey. Hitler had earlier gone t6 Hendaye, 
Spaine with hopes of absorbing Franco's forces on the side of the Axis. See: 
Shirer, Rise and Fall, pp. 814-16.
^ A la n  Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1962), p , 565.
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crossed the Greco-’Albanian frontier at dawn today.
Indeed they had. After a three-hour grace in which to answer an
ultimatum, the Greek Prime Minister, Metaxas, said that the ultimatum meant 
62
war.
Mussolini's attack on Greece showed the world the most effective
manner in which not to execute a blitzkrieg, It was doomed from the start.
63
The time of the year was the poorest choice the Italians could have made.
Lack of planning on the part of the Italians was evident. Ciano relied on
cooperation from Bulgaria to render ineffective (against Italy) a large part of
the Greek Army stationed on the Bulgarian border. Mussolini previously had
had offered to King Boris of Bulgaria the possibility that Bulgaria might be able
64
to gain an outlet on the Aegean Sea. The Duce also told his pommander-in 
chief of the operation, General Bodoglio^ that he had bribed the leading
^  Shirer, p. 816.
z o
°  Survey o f International Affairs, Triumph, p. 340. The pretext 
of the ultimatum was the non-neutral conduct of the Greeks in allowing British 
ships to be repaired and to dock in the Greek inlets and outlets.
^3 piefro Badogji01 Itqly in the Second World War, Memories and 
Documents (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 25.
^  Luigi Vi I lari, Italian Foreign Policy under Mussolini (New Yorkj 
The Devin-Adair Company, 1956), p . 273.
A
Badoglio, p, 27. Marshall Pietro Badoglio, Italian Chief of 
Staff, H'gh Commissioner of East Africa and Governor General of Lybia.
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Greek generals at a rather high price, Ciano also surmised, somewhat pre­
maturely, that the Albanians would look at Epirus^ as a welcome addition to 
their domain and would be excellent fighting companions for Italy.
The Italian Foreign Minister proved to be mistaken on every point. 
For one thing, King Boris of Bulgaria did not want an Aegean seaport so badly 
that he was willing to wage a war for it . In the second place, the Greek 
generals had not been bought off, as the fierce fighting of the armies under 
their leadership illustrated. Finally, the Albanians' "co-operation" with the 
Italians took a form that made themselves more of a nuisance than an a lly .
The comparatively small forces used for the operation, approxi­
mately 70,000, suggested that the Italians counted on a prompt Greek collapsed 
In the beginning, the Italian coastal drive proved to be moderately successful.
Further inland, owing to poor road conditions, advance and supply became
68increasingly difficult.
The inability of the Italian forces to move their mechanized divisions 
on the muddy roads forced them to use the valleys, giving the Greeks free 
reign over the ridges along Italian invasion routes. Conditions such as this
^ A  name given to the land immediately to the south of Albania. 
The large number of Albanians in the Greek controlled province made it a tar­
get for Albanian expansionist aims.
^  Survey of International Affairs, Triumph, p. 341 .
6 8 Mclnnis, V o l.  V . ,  p. 71.
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were responsible for the catastrophic defeat of the Italian Alpine Divisions on 
the Aoos (Viosa) River in early November. Not only did this battle stop the 
Italians cold but it served to give the Greek forces the initiative in the 
struggle.^
Adolf Hitler termed the Italian invasion of Greece a "regretable 
70
blunder." It was more than that, It was the main reason for the forced
military occupation of Southeastern Europe and the eventual Balkan participa-
71 72
tion in the war. The O .K .W . realized the effect of the thwarted inva­
sion immediately. It meant that the Allies could not be permitted to open an 
offensive in the Southeast. Hitler, embarrassed and enraged by the presence 
of the British troops in Greece, was particularly concerned about the ease 
with which the Allies would be able to stage air raids over the Rumanian oil 
fields,
69 Ibid.
^ S h ire r, p. 817.
^^ Franz von Pqpen, Memoirs (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co .,
Inc., 1953), p. 464. """
Command.
72
O .K .W . -  Ober commando der Wehlmacht or German High
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Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1939-45
(New York: Frederick A . Praegor, Publishers, 1964), p. 131.
83
Germany now made immediate plans to send troops across Hungary 
. 7 4  . 75
and Bulgaria in order to provide reinforcements to the Italian troops.
Mussolini's blunder in Greece also intensified the importance of the war in the
Mediterranean. On November 12, 1940/ Hitler issued his War Directive No.
18 in which he outlined his plans for the war in the Mediterranean With
the Italian venture obviously doomed to failure, the Fuehrer inserted orders
concerning Greece, " . . . in the event of its becoming necessary to occupy
that part of the Greek mainland north of the Aegean operating from Bulgaria."77
On December 6, 1940,-Field Marshall Erhard Milch arrived in Rome to begin
plans for an air offensive in the Mediterranean ,:78
The Nazi thrust into the Mediterranean spelled the end to whatever
degree of independence the Bqlkan States still maintained. Bulgaria was the
next country to feel the German strangle-hold. The O .K .W , had been work-
79ing on Operation Marita since November. This plan consisted of forcing
^ T h e  advance through Yugoslavia would have been shorter but 
Hitler chose not to jeopardize that country's position as neutral.
7  ̂Wilhelm Keitel, The Memoirs of Field Marshall K eitel. Edited 
by W. Garlitz (NewYork: Stein and Day, 1966).
7^ Originally, its directives pertained to little else but Operation 
Felix, The German code name for the military conquest of Gibralter, the 
Spanish Canary Islands, and the Portugese Cape Verde Islands.
77 N .C .A . ,  V o l. H I. ,  pp. 403-7.
7®Gibson, (Ciano), December 6, 1940, p. 319.
7^German code name for the invasion of Greece.
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Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact and to transport troops across that
80country into Greece by March, 1941.
In the first week of 1941, Milan Pilov, Bulgarian Prime Minister,
visited Berlin for decisive discussions with H itler. King Boris gave him
instructions to consent to what Boris knew the German demands would be:
81
an avenue for the German Army's march to the Aegean. Forty German
staff officers, "tourists," and German businessmen had entered Bulgaria
during the preceding month, Bulgarian public opinion was not against a
German-Bulgarian agreement, since an advance on Salonica and Western
Thrace would mean regaining the Aegean outlet lost in 1913. Bulgaria's
preference of Germany to the Soviet Union was shown by her rejection of a
Soviet proposal for a pact between the two countries, on the grounds that
83
"accession to it would be abandonment of her neutrality."
In a meeting on January 7 , Hitler attempted to ease Bulgaria's 
cause for hesitation in entering the Tripartite Pact, He assured her that 
there was only a slim chance that either Turkey or Yugoslavia would attack 
Bulgaria over the matter . As for the danger of Russian intervention, Hitler
88Wiskeman, p. 253,
8  ̂ Lukacs, p. 352.
82 Ib id ., p. 358.
83 D .G er. F .P ., "D", Vo I . X ., N o . 46B, p . 807.
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stated that such a pact would serve to ally Germany and Bulgaria, Hitler
went on to say that as long as Stalin was alive, it was impossible that
Russia would start anything with Germany. As a proof of this, Hitler
used Rumania as an illustration
The overtures succeeded, because four days later, on January 
85
11, Richthoffen wrote the German Foreign Ministry that:
. the first conversation which (he) had after 
(his) return with the Foreign Minister and the 
Minister President today showed that the Bulgarian 
Government is at heart prepared to sign the Tripartite 
Pact quickly, although apprehensions about military 
consequences that might befall between signing of the 
draft pact and the first German aid (still exist),8^
87The outcome of the talks with Parvan Dragonov were of little
importance. Two days earlier, on January 9, the Fuehrer approved von 
88Brauchitsch's proposal to "get in touch with Bulgaria in order to prepare
quarters for troops south of the Danube for troops crossing first . . ,
89
expected before the end of January ."
84D ,G er ,F .P . , "C", Vol. X , N o. 606, p. 1019.
Or
°Herbert Freiherr von Richthoffen, German Ambassador to
Bulgaria,
D .G e r,F .P . , 11D", V o l. V , ,  No. 648, p, 1080.
87 Parvan Dragnov, Bulgarian Ambassador to Germany.
8 8 Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief 
of the German Army.
89D .G e r,F ,P ,, "D", Vo l. X I . ,  No. 644, p. 1076.
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On January 28, 1941, Jodi telegraphed Hitler that:
announcement of Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite 
Pact is no longer urgent . . . the extent of the 
(troop) entry cannot yet be predicted at this time, 
but will most probably not take place before February,
20.91
An agreement was signed between the two countries on February 8,
, 9 2
1941, between Field Marshall List and the Bulgarian General Staff. It
93agreed to the passage of troops into Bulgaria . On February 28, the
Bulgarian Government formally joined the Tripartite Pact, after German
94troops crossed the Danube from Rumania the evening before. By the end 
of February, only one country separated the German Army from the Aegean 
Sea.
The similar fate of Yugoslavia came about much differently.
Great care had to be exercised in case the Italians might interpret any move 
made against Yugoslavia as a direct interference with their own interests. 
Yugoslavia was the only Balkan country able to supply Italy with the raw
on
General Alfred.Jodi, Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff 
of the O .K .W ,
91 D .G e r .F .P ., "D", V o l. X I . ,  N o . 724, p. 1216.
92 Wilhelm List, Commander of the Twelfth Army, at this time was 
stationed in Rumania»
93 N X  .A . , V o l. IV ., pp, 272-5.
94 Bui lock, p. 583.
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95materials that she desperately needed, such as copper, lead, and bauxite.
If Yugoslavia were to come under Nazi control, Italy's dependence on the
Reich would be increased. The German victories in Western Europe,
96
Mussolini feared, might result in drawing Ante Pavelier's support to the 
97
Nazi camp.
The Italian failures in Greece served to multiply Yugoslavia's 
anxieties . Heretofore, Yugoslavia was important to Germany for only 
political and economical reasons. But now, Germany's relationship with
98Yugoslavia began to have military tones. The Yugoslav position was in
double jeopardy. Without official sanction, the Yugoslav armaments pro-
99ducer, Nikola Stankova, arranged shipments to the Greek army via a 
Turkish businessman in Istanbul. From there, the armaments were shipped 
to Greece. ^  In addition to this, the Greeks received permission from 
Prince Paul to operate and maintain a supply depot in Yugoslav territory.
^H optner, p. 173.
^  Ante Pavelier, pro-fascist Croatian leader. Supported largely 
by funds frpm Mussolini.
^G ibson, (Ciano), May 10, 1940, p. 247.
QQ
Primarily since Yugoslavia had asked Germany to make sure 
that Italian troops stayed out of Salonika. See; Hoptner, p. 190.
^Fprmer Minister of Finance, pro-Greek and a close friend of 
Prince Paul.
Hoptner, p. 191.
101 Ibid.
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In February, Prince Paul told Arthur Lane that Yugoslavia's 
103
position was desperate. With the date of Operation Marita approqch-
ing, Hitler became increasingly aggressive in his overtures to Yugoslavia.
104
On February 15, Hitler conversed with Cvetkovic andCincar- 
.1 0 5
Markovic at Berghof. The talk centered about the danger of
Bolshevist penetration into the Balkans. The fuehrer also hinted at
Yugoslavia's entrance into the Tripartite Pact and offered Salonika as a 
106
bribe. Yugoslavia rejected the proposal on the grounds that such a
107
pact would involve both political and military collaboration.
In the meantime, the Italians were equally ambitious in their
efforts to regain as much influence in Yugoslavia as possible. On
108
February 4, the Duce also offered Salonika as a bait. Paul flatly
102 United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia.
^^CordelI Hull, The Memoirs of GordelI Hull (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1948), Vo l. I I . ,  p. 928.
104
Dragisha Cvetkovic, Yugoslav Prime Minister, February, 
1939 to March, 1941 .
^ “*Aleksandar C inear-Markovic, Yugoslavian Foreign Minister, 
February, 1939 to March, 1941 .
106D .G e r .F .P ., "D", V o l. X L ,  N o. 48, p. 88.
107ploptner, P* 210.
In Mussolini's view, an agreement with Yugoslavia would 
hasten Greece's fall, and at the same time, would stop German interven­
tion which would severely wound Italicin pride.
89
told Mussolini that he would make no agreement with Italy while Italy
109
continued to wage its war on Greece . On February 25, Prince Paul 
informed the Italian Charge d Affaires that he was willing to negotiate 
an agreement with Italy, provided that Italian actions did not alienate
no
public opinion in Yugoslavia against the government, The Germans,
however, interfered in the talks between the two countries on February
22 when the Foreign Ministry ordered:
. . , we wogjd like to suggest that the Italian 
government, in case the Yugoslavs should approach it 
once more, shoult not go more deeply into the sub­
ject in the conversations for the time being and cer­
tainly should not consider any sort of agreement until 
the result of our negotiations now pending was 
certain.  ̂  ̂^
On March 4, Prince Paul paid a secret visit to Hitler at the
Berghof in order to discuss further the possibilities of a German-Yugoslav 
112
Agreement. At the meeting, Hitler granted Paul control of Salonika. 
Such an acquisition would have given Yugoslavia an access to the Aegean . 
The Fuehrer also vowed that Yugoslavia would not be asked to permit 
German troops and supplies to cross its border during the coming Greek
Hoptner, p*. 207.
110 D .G e r.F .P ,,  11D", V o l. X II, N o . 85, p. 158,
111 Ib id ., No. 97, p. 180.
 ̂^B u llock , p. 583.
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H 3hostilities.  On March 24, 1941, the Yugoslav Prime Minister,
Cvetokovic, accompanied by Foreign Minister Cincar-Markovic slipped
•if
114
out of Belgrade and went to Vienna. In the presence of Hitler and
115
Ribbentrop, the pact was signed the following morning. Hitler
closed the meeting yvith a reassuranee of his earlier pledges. (Even he 
did not realize, however, that of all his broken pledges, changing cir­
cumstances destined this to be the shortest Iived.)
It looked as if  Yugoslavia, like Rumania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia and Austria, were now under the iron hand of Nazism. 
The supposition was brief. During the night of March 26 and 27, a
group of Yugoslav officers, fearing their country'? participation in the
116.
Pact, staged a coup d'etat. There had been an atmosphere of unrest
in Yugoslavia as early as 1937 but it was not until January of 1941 that
. H 7General Dusan Simovic considered an overthrow warranted. It pro­
vided the only alternative to making complete capitulation of Yugoslavia
118
to Nazi Germany necessary.
113D .G e r .F .P ., 11D", X I I . ,  N o. 130, p. 231.
T14 There existed a fear of kidnap by hostile anti-N azi demon­
strators so their exit was held in strictest secrecy.
 ̂^Bullock, p. 583,
116 , ,
Ib id ., p. 584.
^^Commander of the Yugoslav Air Force,
'^®Ristic, p. 84.
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The actual planning of the Yugoslav coup d1 etat was done by
. 1 1 9Simonic's assistant, General Broivja~Mirkovic. After the overthrow,
Cvetkovic and his Foreign Minister, Cincar-Markovic/ were arrested by 
120
the revolutionaries. The following night, Prince Paul and his
12!
family left for Greece. In his place, King Peter ascended the
122throne on March 28, 1941. General Simovic then took over as 
123
Prime Minister.
The coup d' etat threw Hitler into one of his wildest rages.
A war council was called at the Chancellery on March 27. The trouble 
in Belgrade endangered both Operations Marita and Barbarossa. The 
Fuehrer ta|d the conference that he had no intention of standing for that: 
now he would smash Yugoslavia once and fo ra ll . Never mind what the
^^Hoptner, p. 252,
120Dfqgisa N , Ristic, Yugoslavia’s Revolution of 1941 
(University Park, Pennsylvania: T he Pennsy I van ia Sta te Un i versi ty 
Press, 1966), pp. 95-100.
l ^  Hoptner, p. 266.
1 ^According to the constitution, it was illegal for him to 
take the throne before his eighteenth birthday (September 6, 1941).
See: Ristic, p. 187.
123
It had been suggested, to no avail, that Cincar-Markovic 
be retained as Prime Minister, primarily as a move to gain Germany's 
trust, at least until the shock of the coup d' etat had time to settle in 
Berlin. See:; Hoptner, p. 265,
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new government might tell him, he had been disgracefully betrayed and a
.124
declaration of loyalty would only be a feint, to play to win time.
In his rage, Hitler issued "War Directive N o. 25 concerning the
fate of Yugoslavia:
No diplomatic enquiries will be made nor ultimatums 
presented . . . the blow against Yugoslavia shall be 
pitilessly struck and her military destruction (will) be 
carried out with lightning speed . ■. . . The war 
should be very populqr in Italy, Hungary, ahd Bulgaria 
sipce their states might hope to make territorial gains; 
for Italy, the Adriatic Coast, the Banat for Hungary, 
and Macedonia for Bulgaria .  ̂2^
The attack was scheduled to begin on April 6 . The day before the attack
Hitler telegraphed to Mussolini and expressed his desire for the postponement
of any Italian military clashes with the Greeks, Hitler also demanded that
126
the Italian forces wait for German strategic orders. The plan tp destroy
Yugoslavia also relied on Hungarign cooperation. On March 28, Hitler dis-
127
patched General Sztojay to Budapest to convey to Horthy his desire for m ili­
tary assistance and to promise (Hungary that she had a chance to fulfill her 
128
revisionist aims, This placed the Hungarians in a pred icament.
124Keitel, p. 138,
125
N .C .A , , V o l. V I r , pp. 938-9.
^26<Wiskemann, p. 256.
127 Dome Sztojay, Hungarian Foreign Minister to Germany. 
128D.Ger.F.P., "D” , V o l. X I I . ,  N o. 215, p. 369,
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Hungary had allowed passage of German troops through her country while
enroute to Rumania, Now Germany wqs not only asking Hungary's permission
for transit rights, but was pressuring her to take an active part in the attack on
Yugoslavia, fully realizing that Hungary had just concluded q pqct of friend-
129
ship with Yugoslavia four weeks before. The Hungarian Prime Minister,
Pal Teleski, could not bring himself to suppprt such a move, As the only way
130
out of his dilemma, he committed suicide on April 3, 1941 , In a letter to
Hitler on that same date,Horthy expressed his desire to cooperate with the
Germans qnd listed the military measures which had already been adopted by
the country. The Regent was, however, of the opinion that mobilization would
not be completed until April 15 but that operations could be carried out as early 
131
as the 12th.
132
Operation Punishment began with a ruthless bombing of Belgrade 
on April 6 , The New York Times reported that bombing missions at roof-top 
heights (for Belgrade had no anti-aircraft guns) killed 17,000 civilians in three
129
Horthy, Memoirs, p. 183,
130
/  D iGer ;F.:P., "D", V o l, X I I . ,  N o . 261, p. 447, See also:
The Times (London), ApriT 4, 1941.
 ̂^  Szinqi and Szuce, (Horthy), p, 177. See also; D .G e r,F .P ., 
"D", V o l. X I I . ,  p. 306, p. 509.
132
Hitler's special code name for the Yugoslav invasion.
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1 3 3  Adays. The Yugoslav Army did not have time to mobilize byt gathered
hastily to defend its country against the onslaught’ of German troops. Poorly
equipped, deployed, and organized, it offered little resistance to the
■Wehlmacht. Yugoslavia, divided by Croatian and Yerbian factions, also
lacked political unity. This thwarted any attempt towards military unity and
134
hastened the collapse of the Army. On its drive to Belgrade, the German 
Army captured 15,000 soldiers, including 22 generals , By the end of the twelfth
day of fhe Yugoslav campaign, approximately 254,000 Yugoslav soldiers fell
)ds.
136
135
into German han  On April 17, C incar -Markov ic signed the uncondi­
tional surrender.
The armistice was really a document that provided the blueprint for 
the termination of Yugoslavia's political existence as a monarchy. Germany
137
received the Slovine territories of Maribor and C elje. She also maintained 
full authority over the Banat, which was intended later to serve as the core of a
133New York Times, April 7, 1941.
^3̂ Hoptner, p. 287.
135 Ibid.
1 ̂
Cincar-/Vktrkovic signed thearmistice because no responsible head 
of the Yugoslav Revolutionary Government still remained in the country. See: 
Hoptner, pp. 288-92.
136
This included the territory that Yugoslavia received from Austria
in 1919.
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German Sudgau. The Reich also maintained full contrpl over Serbia
which was put under the control o f the Serbian Fascist General Lyotic.
Italy's claims to the dismembered country were treated on the same
139
level as the rest of the satellite countries. She received the southern part
of Slovenia and part of the Dalmatian seacoast from Split to the Albanian
border, and was appointed as the protector of Montenegro f The Yugoslavian
kingdom had lasted less than two decades. By mid-April, 1941, it ceased to
exist as a political entity.
The military occupation of Yugoslavia was notan isolated incident.
Germany began its Operation Marita at the same time as it began its Operation
Punishment. Operation Marita began on April 6 when German troops crossed
14°
into Greece from Bulgaria .
The plans for the invasion of Greece were not made with the same 
wrath as the plans fpr the invasion of Yugoslavia had been. Kietel wrote that 
Hitler:
was basically minded to give the Greeks an honourable 
settlement in recognition of their brave struggle and
Sudgau was the term used for a proposed German colony on the 
lower Danube made up of German-inhabited districts of Tolna in Hungary and 
the Backa, together with the Banat.
^^Bullock, p. 586.
Survey of International Affairs, Triumph, p. 361.
of their blamelessness for this war; after a ll, the 
Italians had started i t , ^
Hitler was later to say that the campaign in Greece was not directed
against the Greeks per se; nor was it directed toward the purpose of rescuing
his Italian Allies, but it was undertaken solely as a precaution against a
142
British attempt to entrench themselves in the Balkans. The immediate task,
however, was the expulsion of British troops from Greece.
On March 4, Sir Anthony Eden^^ and General 0111 arranged 
145with Prime Minister Korizis that British aid should be sent to Greece. This
aid consisted of the British First Armoured Brigade, the New Zealand Division,
and the Sixth Australian Division. The Polish Brigade and the Seventh
146
Australian Division were to follow by the end of the month,
On April 5 , the German Foreign Ministry telegraphed its intentions 
to the legqtion in Athens. The cablegram also included Germany's justification
141
Keitel, p. 141.
^^Bullock, p. 585.
143 British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
^ ^ C h ie f of the -Imperial British General Staff.
145Alexander Korizis, Greek Prime Minister from January 29 to 
April 18, 1941, replacing Metaxas who did in early January, 1941. He was 
decidedly more Germanophile than Metaxas.
146
Churchill, Memoirs, p. 426.
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for the occupation. The Reich, in possession of "documentary evidence" 
charged that:
. .. . These documents point out that the Greek 
Government . . » concerning whose unneutral ponduct 
since the beginning of the war . . . by permitting strong 
English forces to enter the country has itself brought on 
a situation towards which Germany can no longer remain 
inactive. The Reich government has therefore now ordered 
its troops to expel the British forces from Greek soil. Any 
resistance offered to the Wehrmacht will be ruthlessly 
crushed . , . it is emphasized that the German troops do 
not come as enemies of the Greek people and that the 
German people have no intention of fighting or destroying 
the Greek people as such. Rather the blow which Germqny 
is compelled to strike on Greek territory is aimed at 
England. 4̂7
On April 6, Field Marshall List, Commander of the German Twelfth
Army which consisted of fifteen divisions (four of them armoured) crossed into
Greece. The Greeks, exhausted after six months of fighting with the Italians,
offered only a token resistance . Prime Minister Korizis committed suicide and
148
the nation's leadership fell into the hands of the Army. On April 20, the
Greek generals in Epirus and Macedonia offered capitulation to the advancing 
Germans. General Tsolakoglu, commander of the Epirus army, made a deal
with the Germans behind the backs of the Italians in order to save Epirus from
, 149
Mussolini.
147D .G e r .F .P ., "D", V o l. X I I , ,  N o, 274, p. 465. 
148 Survey o f International Affairs, Triumph, p. 
^4^Lukacs, p. 384.
98
On April 21, the Greeks informed the British that continued struggle
15° 151 .
against the Germans was pointless. General Papagos told General
152
Wilson that in order to prevent the devastation of Greece, British troops
should re-embark,
On the 23rd of April, the Greek Government temporarily evacuated
154
to Crete, and four days later the German Army entered Athens, It was
another example, as Churchill wrote, of "One at a Time" of Germany's policy
155
towards the Balkans.
The Greeks, as in the case of Yugoslavia, stood helplessly by and 
watched the division of their country. General Tsolakogulu was placed in
156
charge of forming a government to accept the German terms.
As a result of the Greek occupation , Bulgaria recovered’Western 
Thrace, Eastern Macedonia and the regions of Florine and Kastoria, lost fo
Mediterranean
153
150Survey of International Affairs, Triumph, p . 362.
151 Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army.
1 5 2 .Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland, Supreme Commander of the
Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 225.
154 Survey of International Affairs, Triumph, p. 362, 
^^C hurchill, Memoirs, p. 429.
156Gibson, (Ciano), April 27, 1941, p. 343.
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157 158
her since 1919. Germany maintained direct control over Salonika.
The Fuehrer brushed Mussolini's claims of Salonika aside by saying that
Bulgaria had requested it earlier and had received German approval. In
159
doing so, the Reich preserved the area for military intentions. Thus, the 
last country in Southeastern Europe had joined the vast Nazi hinterland.
^^Lukacs, p. 384.
158
The area was entrusted to General Lehr's administration. It 
was to be used as a military center for Eastern operations,
159 Survey of International Affairs, Triumph, p . 362.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Operations Punishment and Marita began simultaneously on April 6, 
1941. The occupation of the two countries, Yugoslavia and Greece, resulted 
in the complete loss of independence by the Balkan States. In actuality, that 
had occurred as early as 1938. Practically speaking, it began soon after 
Hitler ascended to power in 1933.
This paper has dealt with the gradual encirclement of Southeastern 
Europe by Nazi Germany. There are numerous reasons why the Reich was 
unimpeded in its Balkan penetration. The first, and most important of these 
reasons must lie with the Western democracies' inability (or unwillingness) to 
offer economic assistance to Southeastern Europe. This forced the individual 
Balkan nations to rely more and more on the Third Reich.
As the depression slowly came to an end, the nations of the world 
adopted a fiercely nationalistic and protective attitude to stimulate their 
domestic economies. The standard policy called for as little  importation as 
possible. Here again was a factor that aided Germany in its early stages of 
penetration. The Reich was a heavy importer of foodstuffs and exporter of 
finished goods. The Balkan countries relied almost solely on exportation of 
goodstuffs and had to import nearly all their finished goods. Hence, from the
100
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beginning, a mutual attraction -developed. With the closing of the world 
markets to the Southeastern European countries, they willingly accepted the 
generous proposals offered by the Reich.
The rearmament policy in Germany and the hesitancy of the Western 
democracies to enforce the provisions of the Versailles Treaty enticed the 
Balkans into the German camp. The weaknesses shown by France, Great 
Britain and the United States served to induce the countries of Southeastern 
■ Europe to lean to the Reich. The growing strength of Nazi Germany was at 
first used as a bargaining power in Southeastern Europe. St soon revealed itself 
as a threat to the Balkans' very independence. As the fascist regime grew 
bolder In its defiance towards the'West, the lack of the latter's response 
illustrated the futility of the Balkans expecting assistance from Western Europe 
and the United States. Southeastern.Europe also began to see Its own immedi­
ate danger were it to fall in disfavor with Hitler.
The German modus operand! concerning the Balkans, although 
involving a complicated system of economic devices, was simple: gain a 
ready access to easy credit and accumulate large debts. In this way, the only 
manner by which the creditor nations could hope to realize a return would be 
to accept any and all products the Reich exported to them. Germany, in turn, 
found a source of steady supply for its foodstuff requirements and, also, had an 
outlet for products that had little  demand on the world market.
The vast Industrialization of Germany resulted in an acute shortage 
of oil in the Reich. From 1936 onward, the Ploesti oil fields of Rumania
102
affected Germany's entire policy toward Southeastern Europe. Aside from 
economic value, the Balkans began to have a strategic importance to the Nazi 
hierarchy. Guaranty of the priceless commodity became the primary factor 
in the Reich's involvement with Southeastern Europe. It Is here that the fate 
of Southeastern Europe was sealed.
The Anschluss and the occupation of Czechoslovakia placed the 
Reich in direct proximity to the Balkans. By that time, Southeastern Europe 
was almost wholly dependent economically on Nazi Germany. Utilizing 
’Western hesitancy as a trump card, Reich diplomats pressed for troop move­
ments throughout the Balkan area .
'With the outbreak of the war, it became necessary for Germany to 
consolidate Southeastern Europe; not only to insure the safety of its oil and 
other supplies, but to protect itself from the possibility of the Allies opening 
upaSoutheastern front. In doing this, the Nazi diplomats played on the very 
weakness of the Balkan States themselves; the bitterness among the States 
caused by the post “World War I peace settlements. Courting the individual 
revisionist appetites of these States, the Reich succeeded in bringing the 
countries under her direct control.
- Germany also used the inherent Balkan fear of the Soviet Union to 
its awn advantage. The proximity of the Russian menace to Southeastern Europe 
(especially to Rumania) facilitated Nazi intervention in Balkan affairs. After 
the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, Balkan diplomats openly soqght the Reich's 
guarantee of their independence in the event of Russian aggression .
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Two events resulted in the outright military occupation of South­
eastern Europe, The first was an erratic attempt by Italy to realize her own 
expansionist aims in Greece, The second was a military coup d‘ etat in 
Yugoslavia. These, added to the presence of Allied troops in Greece, resul­
ted in an overt military campaign into the Balkans.
Though the gradual, total subjugation of the Balkans encompassed 
eight years, the result was the same. As of June, 1941, Rumania, Bulgaria, 
Greece, and Yugoslavia were added to an impressive list that included 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and France 
a s satte I i tes o f the Th i r d Re i c h.
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Among the documentary materials that were used during the preparation 
©f this paper, those which were the most frequently used and which proved to 
be the most important were the annual pub! ications of the League of Nations. 
These statistical volumes provide an analysis of every aspect of international 
financial transactions on a yearly basis. The most-important of these publica­
tions and those volumes which are the most frequently quoted are: Review of
World Trade and World Economic Survey. These two volumes helped the 
researcher a great deal in his quest for economic facts, figures and other sta­
tistical data.
Other documents which were of great value in the research on,the eco­
nomic portion of this thesis was Great Britain's Department of Overseas Trade's
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publication, Economic Conditions in Germany to March, 1938, and the U .S . 
Tqriff Commission's, Compilation of Data on United States Trade with Germany. 
The former, obtained from Duke University, Durham, North Carolina through 
inter-library, loan, provided an abundance of data and an excellent insight 
into economic events inside the Third Reich .
No paper concerning Nazi Germany, whether or not it deals with the 
subject of economics, can be attempted without that veritable wealth of infor­
mation which is. found in the UnitedStates Department of State's Documents 
on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. The researcher of this paper relied 
heavily on both series "C" and "D" of this publication. Other documents of 
considerable value were the volumes ofs Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression and 
Trial of the ■Major War Criminals, Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945 -  October 1,
1946. These documents are both very similar but Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression is much better organized, both in the categorial and chronological 
sense. For this reason, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression is the most fre­
quently used of the two volumes.
The State Department's publications, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1949-41, 
was very useful in analyzing the Soviet Union's increasing interest and activity 
in the affairs of Southeastern Europe. The Foreign Relations of the United 
States , 1933-39 was also used but not as much as Nazi-Soviet Relations,
1939-41.
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Although the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System's 
Federal Reserve Bulletin is listed in the bibliography, it is not cited in the 
text. Volume X X il was used as a handbook in an attempt to keep abreast 
with the ever fluctuating currency values.
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The study of the memoirs and papers of the individuals concerned with 
the topic of this paper was a constant source of disappointment. Almost with­
out exception, the books were filled with excuses, explanations, cover-ups 
or personal glorification for the actions of the individuals concerned during 
this period in time. Also, to my personal chagrin, the various authors did
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not see much importance to the events taking place in the Balkans and, conse­
quently, the Reich's movements in'Southeastern Europe were handled very 
lightly.
The notable exception was Winston Churchill‘s book, The Gathering 
Storm, Early in this book, Winston Churchill stressed the value of the 
Balkans to the economy and political balance of the world outside the Reich, 
His brilliant six-volume treatise provides an excellent background for the 
study of the events leading up to and during the war years,,
- Several other memoirs are worth mentioning, either for their usefulness 
or worthlessness. The Ciano Diaries were frequently consulted, and proved 
to be of some use in the section on the Italian invasion of Greece in the 
thesis. The Memoirs of Field Marshal Keitel (understanding the author's 
need for haste rather than accuracy) were of little use. As the General 
rarely spoke of his own accord while alive, little can be expected of his 
revelations to posterity.
Several memoirs, such as Badoglio's Italy in the Second World W ar,
The Ironside Diaries, 1937-1940, and The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay 
were somewhat useful in the research on the military aspects which are men­
tioned in the latter part of the thesis.
Franz von Papen in his Memoirs presents a fair insight on the German 
push to the Southeast, although the information is much too general,
no
Unquestionably, the most disappointing source of the entire biblio- 
graphy was Dr. Schacht's Confessions of "The Old Wizard." Schacht gives 
no account and rarely mentions his plans concerning Southeastern Europe. 
Instead, and this is true of all too many of the memoirs, Schacht uses his 
reminiscences as a whitewash for his role in Nazi government affairs.
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The era of Nazi power in Germany is one of the most written about 
periods in history. Because of this, there is no problem in accumulating a 
large number of secondary sources containing information on the Third Reich. 
It was also fortunate that several excellent books have been published which 
concentrate on the manner and methods which the Nazi hierarchy used to 
finance their rise to military greatness. Some of these books are: Sweezy!s 
The Structure of the Naz i Economy, Vaso,Trivanovitch's Economic Develop­
ment of Germany under National Social ism, Gustaf Sto 1 per1 s The German
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Economy, 1870 to the Present, and Burton H . Klein's Germany's Economic 
Preparation for War . Of  these books, Maxine Sweezy's must rate as the 
best, not only for its thoroughness but also because of its extensive biblio­
graphy and references. Another secondary source vital to the research for 
this paper is S «E. Harris's Exchange Depreciation. This is a complicated 
book but is extremely valuable if  one is to understand the problems raised by 
currency fluctuation and exchange controls.
•For general background information on data concerning the Third 
Reich, two books are indispensable. These books are; H itler, A Study in 
Tyranny by Alan Bullock and its offspring, The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich by William Shirer. These books give the reader an extensive insight 
into the era and present an excellent springboard for further research. 
■Survey of International Affairs also gives one a never ending supply of infor­
mation. These volumes, published by the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs acquaint the researcher with every aspect of European events of the 
era.
The most valuable books dealing with the Balkan States were L.S. 
Stavrianos1 The Balkans Since 1453, and Kerner and Howard's The Balkan 
Entente 1930-35. These sources offered a tremendous amount of extensive, 
detailed and well researched information.
There were several books that proved to be very useful in providing 
information on Germany's economic encroachment into Southeastern Europe. 
Antonin Basch's work, The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere
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is very thorough in its coverage of the Reich's advance into the Balkans. 
Basch's work, combined with Schacher's Germany Pushes Southeast pro­
vided the general outline for this paper. These books were filled with sta­
tistics, tables and bibliographical aids, and proved to be indispensable to 
the paper's research.
For a very brilliant and involved analysis of Dr. Schacht's manner 
of penetration into the Balkans, Amos E. Simpson's treatise, Hjalmar 
Schacht in Perspective, is excellent. This book was not only informative 
and useful in itself but its documentation provided a sound basis for further 
research.
As the research began to involve itself more and more around the 
military aspect, several secondary sources became extremely useful, in 
addition to the ones already cited. Elizabeth Wiskemann's The Rome- 
Berlin Axis was useful in the research on the problems concerning 
Yugoslavia. J.B. Hoptner's highly documented Yugoslavia in Crisis, 
1934-41 was indispensable in that area. James E .-McSherry in his Sta I in, 
Hitler and Europe, 1933-39 strengthened the arguments for Russia's growing 
interest In the Balkans.
The Great Powers and Eastern Europe by John A , Lukacs was one of 
the best sources dealing with inter-Balkan conflicts and their problems with 
the Great Powers. Highly documented, M r. Lukacs' work presented perhaps 
the most extensive and all inclusive secondary source of the bibliography.
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The bound volumes of The Economist obtained from the University of 
Nebraska are the most valuable periodicals referred to in the research of this 
paper. The articles, while not only concurring with the intentions of this
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thesis, also gave the researcher a never ending supply of statistics, tables 
and other valuable data.
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The value of a newspaper in research to an author is highly ques­
tionable except for providing general background information. Too often 
editors seem to distort, exaggerate or otherwise "tamper" with information 
to make it more attractive to this subscribers.
